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Partners No More: Relational Transformation and the Turn
to Litigation in Two Conservationist Organizations
Noga Morag-Levine
The rise in litigation against administrative bodies by environmental and
other political interest groups worldwide has been explained predominantly
through the liberalization of standing doctrines. Under this explanation,
termed here "the floodgate model," restrictive standing rules have dammed
the flow of suits that groups were otherwise ready and eager to pursue. I
examine this hypothesis by analyzing processes of institutional transformation
in two conservationist organizations: the Sierra Club in the United States and
the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI). Rather than an
eagerness to embrace newly available litigation opportunities, as the "flood-
gate" model would predict, the groups' history reveals a gradual process of
transformation marked by internal, largely intergenerational divisions
between those who abhorred conflict with state institutions and those who
saw such conflict as not only appropriate but necessary to the mission of the
group. Furthermore, in contrast to the pluralist interactions that the
"floodgate model" imagines, both groups' relations with pertinent agencies
in earlier eras better accorded with the partnership-based corporatist
paradigm. Sociolegal research has long indicated the importance of relational
distance to the transformation of interpersonal disputes. I argue that, at the
group level as well, the presence or absence of a (national) partnership-
centered relationship determines propensities to bring political issues to court.
As such, well beyond change in groups' legal capacity and resources, current
increases in levels of political litigation suggest more fundamental transforma-
tions in the structure and meaning of relations between citizen groups and the
state.
The appearance of political interest groups as litigants in
American courts has become so commonplace that it is easy to
overlook the relative novelty of this legal-political phenomenon.
Although some such groups have relied on litigation at least since
the start of the twentieth century, it was only during the 1950s and
1960s that a broad spectrum of interests and a large number of
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political organizations turned to the courts (Epstein & Kobylka
1992; Koshner 1998). Several decades later, interest groups
elsewhere in the world have now begun to follow suit, heralding
a global judicialization of political disputes (Tate & Vallinder 1995).
While this trend has been widely diagnosed, little research has
focused on what accounts for such differences in the litigation
propensity of groups over time. This study considers this issue by
analyzing processes of institutional transformation in two con-
servationist organizations: the Sierra Club in the United States and
the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI).
The history of environmental interest group litigation in the
United States is among the most evident examples of transforma-
tion in the salience of law and courts to the agenda of political
groups. Until the 1960s, environmental lawsuits in America were,
by and large, limited to nuisance disputes concerning pollution and
other interferences with private rights; the practice of legal
challenges by environmental groups to administrative policies,
which would later become a central pillar of American environ-
mental activism, did not then exist. Yet by the later 1960s, two
categories of environmental organizations began to bring legal
challenges of this type. The first was new groups, such as the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), that were created in large part for the
purpose of launching such legal mobilization. The second category
consisted of longstanding conservationist organizations, such as the
Sierra Club, that now added litigation strategies to their repertoire.
A parallel pattern is evident in Israel, where environmental
litigation on the part of interest groups was exceedingly rare until
the 1990s. Behind the growth in levels of environmental lawsuits
since then stand both the Israel Union for Environmental Defense,
an NRDC-modeled group that was created in 1991 (Morag-Levine
2001), and SPNI, an established conservationist organization akin
to the Sierra Club. Both groups thus represent organizations
whose strategies came over time to include litigation against
agencies. In this they offer especially useful cases for examining the
origins of change in use of litigation by interest groups. This is
because it is through in-depth analysis of the history of these
groups that one can discern what prevented conservationist
organizations from bringing legal actions against agencies earlier,
and consequently, what manner of change precipitated the groups'
subsequent transformation in this respect.
To the extent that these intertwined questions have been
addressed previously, the predominant response has highlighted
changes in the groups' capacity to litigate. This argument ascribes
this enhanced capacity both to growth in foundation-based
financial support for litigation (Berry 1977) and, most important,
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the liberalization of narrow standing doctrines that had previously
demanded demonstration of specific injury to the group or its
members as a precondition to challenging administrative decisions
in court (e.g., Orren 1976; Harris & Milkis 1996; Hjelmar 1996).
In this connection, the liberalization of standing has meant both the
creation of greater opportunities for citizen group participation in
hearings conducted by administrative agencies and the right of
these groups subsequently to challenge these decisions in court.
The turning point, under this view, came once the courts
reversed their earlier restrictive doctrines in this regard, most
famously in the 2nd Circuit's decision in Scenic Hudson (1965) that
an ad hoc group of local citizens and clubs did indeed have the
standing to challenge, as "private attorneys general," a license to
construct an electric generating system on Storm King Mountain in
New York's upper Hudson Valley. In a similar vein, Dotan and
Hofnung (2001) stress the link between the Israeli Supreme
Court's drastic expansion of groups' standing to sue and growth in
levels of interest group litigation during the 1990s.
The hypothesis that the liberalization of standing will trigger a
surge in interest group litigation can be thought of as a "floodgate"
model under which restrictive standing rules have dammed the
flow of suits that groups were otherwise ready and eager to pursue.
According to this argument, environmental groups failed to litigate
in earlier eras because they could not satisfy judicial requirements
that they show direct injury to themselves or their members. With
the relaxation of these demands, such groups acquired the hitherto
missing legal capacity to challenge administrative decisions. The
removal of external barriers-rather than internal transformations
in the groups' desire to launch legal suits-is, within this frame-
work, a key explanation for differences in the litigation propensity
of political groups over time.
In its emphasis on change in legal capacity, the floodgate model
accords with the predominant explanation regarding current
sources of variation in the litigation propensity of interest groups.
Within this line of scholarship, differences in financial, legal, and
other organizational resources serve as the principal explanation
for whether, and with what frequency, groups opt to litigate
(Epstein 1985; Olson 1990; Scheppele & Walker 1991). The
propensity to litigate is thus thought to increase with the amount of
a group's power and resources. A competing view, known as the
"political disadvantage theory," conceives of litigation as the
instrument of groups lacking the necessary access or resources
for successful pursuit of their goals through other political channels
(Cortner 1968). In other words, this theory suggests an inverse
correlation between a group's political power and its propensity to
litigate. The theory was based in large part on the example of the
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the model of litigation that it pioneered, but it could
explain only a small fraction of the universe of interest group
litigation with the adoption of this strategy by a large number of
"advantaged" groups. As Scheppele and Walker (1991) show, by
the 1980s, "insider" American interest groups were almost as likely
to litigate as "outsider" ones, although the prospect of future
interactions and cooperation was seen as a potential barrier to
some interest group lawsuits. Yet the extent to which this
represented a shift from an earlier era when insider political
organizations were unlikely to file suit has not been a focus of this
body of political science work.
In attending to the groups' outsider or insider status,
Scheppele and Walker build on a rich sociolegal tradition
regarding the impact of relational structures on individuals'
propensity to litigate. A central tenet of this research tradition is
that to understand differences in the transformation of inter-
personal disputes, we must look first to the structure of relations
between the parties, rather than their legal and financial capacity to
litigate (Macaulay 1963; Engel 1984; Ellickson 1991; Greenhouse
1986; Hamilton & Sanders 1992). In other words, whether a
particular private dispute will end in court depends only in part on
the existence of a legal cause of action and the means to pursue it.
More fundamentally, it is the structure and meaning of the
pertinent relationship that determine the trajectory of processes
of dispute transformation. Under this view, litigation is incompa-
tible with the maintenance of what are termed here partnership
relations, that is, relations based on shared interests, identity, and/or
affective bonds. Conversely, resort to litigation signals an absence,
or breakdown, of any such partnership.
In contrast to this sociolegal perspective, studies of interest
group litigation have generally ignored the relevance of parallel
processes of transformation in the identity of groups and their
relations with administrative agencies. An a priori assumption
regarding the inherent absence of partnership between interest
groups and the agencies they seek to influence has discouraged
attention to the role of relational transformation in bringing about
litigation by interest groups. This assumption derives, in turn, from
pluralist-inspired conceptions of the behavior and role of interest
groups. Partnership relations entail some manner of overarching
shared purpose to which partners are expected to subsume
conflicting interests. Yet the very absence of any such collective
national enterprise is a starting premise of the pluralist paradigm.
"In developing a group interpretation of politics," Truman writes,
"we do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because
one does not exist" (1971:51). Under this assumption, there would
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be no basis for expecting deference by groups toward the priorities
and decisions of the state. On the contrary, it is the process of
unencumbered competition between self-interested groups that
defines and serves the common good. By definition, whether such
groups will opt to sue the state will depend on their legal capacity
and prospects for success, rather than underlying relational
constraints.
Implicit to the floodgate model is the assumption that the
groups have fit the pluralist mold all along, i.e., that litigation, long
before the floodgates opened, has been seen as an appropriate
strategy consistent with the groups' ideology and sense of mission.
The relevant change, in other words, has been external to the
groups. However, one cannot a priori assume the groups'
longstanding pluralist identity in view of the counter-example of
corporatist modes of political organization, a mode associated with
western European countries but common across many regions of
the world (Schmitter 1974; Williamson 1989; Lijphart & Crepaz
1991; Wiarda 1997). Unlike their pluralist counterparts, corpora-
tist groups are often licensed, recognized, and even subsidized by
the state (Schmitter 1974). Furthermore, in contrast to pluralism's
rejection of notions of an inclusive national interest, "corporatism
requires of each interest group that it at least suspend, if not
eliminate, commitment to its own well-being in favor of a more
public good" (Zeigler 1988:69). Katzenstein refers to this corpora-
tist phenomenon as an ideology of "social partnership" between
political organizations and state institutions (1985:32).
As has been shown repeatedly, legal challenges to adminis-
trative decisions tend to be less frequent within corporatist systems,
such as exist in Germany, France, Sweden, and even Britain, than
in the paradigmatically pluralist United States (e.g., Kelman 1981;
Brickman,Jasanoff, & Ilgen 1985; Vogel 1986; Sellers 1995; Kagan
& Axelrad 2000; Kagan 2001). Narrow standing rules (typical of
corporatist systems) provide partial explanation for this diver-
gence. However, two arguments suggest that these rules are not in
and of themselves sufficient to explain this difference. The first is
the relative scarcity of litigation within corporatist systems, even by
entities and groups unaffected by narrow standing doctrines (such
as business organizations that might otherwise challenge policies
that directly impinge on their interests) (Brickman, Jasanoff, &
Ilgen 1985; Sellers 1995). The second counter-argument to the
standing-based hypothesis derives from larger patterns of colla-
boration within corporatist regimes between bureaucracies and
interest groups (Zeigler 1988). Well beyond litigation, corporatist
groups tend to avoid all manner of explicit conflict with the state,
an aversion that cannot logically be attributed to standing doctrines
as these have no relevance to adversarial tools beyond the realm of
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the courts. And, in fact, one might argue that these doctrines can
themselves be seen as derivative of governing partnership
ideologies and attendant conceptions of the proper purpose of
political groups. From this perspective, one can see both the
expansion of standing and groups' embrace of litigation as the
product of a larger pluralist transformation and the decline of
earlier partnership ideologies within and outside the groups.
In examining the potential impact of any such partnership
ideology, the pertinent question is not about the actual existence of
any such overarching national interest or the validity of demands
that groups subsume particularistic goals to collective ones. Rather,
it is whether relevant actors construe their relationship with the
state in terms of such an obligation. As March and Olsen explain,
institutions can define the domain of "appropriate" action, which
in turn shapes political behavior (1989:38). Discerning this process
demands a methodology that closely attends to such groups' own
understandings of their purposes, identities, and sense of member-
ship over time (e.g., Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Orren & Skowronek
1995; Powell 1991).
In particular, the behavior of groups before and after a
significant widening of legal opportunities to sue can illuminate the
relative roles of tactics and ideology in determining groups'
adoption or rejection of litigation as a strategy for political
mobilization. However, an exclusive focus on this moment of
transformation is insufficient due to the possibility that organiza-
tional inertia or habits might delay the adoption of newly available
litigation opportunities by established groups. Consequently,
disentangling the potentially circular link between groups' capacity
and desire to litigate requires analysis of the place within their
organizational repertoire of adversarial strategies, other than
litigation, over time.
This study undertakes this task with regard to the Sierra Club
and SPNI, two groups whose history spans a sharp move toward
interest-group pluralism and liberalization of standing doctrines in
their respective national locales. The article focuses on the
response of these organizations to the change. Rather than an
eagerness to embrace newly available litigation opportunities, as
the floodgate model would predict, the groups' history reveals a
gradual process of transformation marked by internal, largely
intergenerational, divisions between those who abhorred conflict
with state institutions and those who saw such conflict as not only
appropriate but necessary to the mission of the group, which had
been recast in a pluralist mold. The reformulation of each
organization as an adversarially oriented interest group-a
necessary precursor to the adoption of political litigation as an
organizational strategy-was precipitated by a pluralist shift in the
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larger political environment of the two societies. I argue that in
parallel to the transformation of interpersonal disputes, at the
group level as well, the presence or absence of a (national)
partnership-centered relationship determines propensities to
bring political issues to court. As such, well beyond change in
groups' legal capacity and resources, current increases in levels of
political litigation suggest more fundamental transformations in
the structure and meaning of relations between citizen groups and
the state.
Liberalized Standing and Reluctant Litigants
The rush of environmental litigation that followed in the wake
of Scenic Hudson (1965)-most importantly through the creation of
the NRDC and EDF-supports the case's import in precipitating
new forms of environmental and other interest group litigation.
But the evident increase in environmental litigation subsequent to
the case does not in and of itself establish that it was for lack of
standing that environmental groups failed to pursue litigation
strategies up to that point. On the contrary, the prominent role of
new environmental organizations in the promotion of environ-
mental lawsuits suggests reluctance on the part of the established
conservationist organizations to embrace newly available opportu-
nities for legal action. In fact, as the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the EDF suggest, it was partially in response to this
ambivalence that the new environmental law organizations were
created in the first place. The group of New Yorkers who ultimately
established the EDF began with the idea of forming a litigation arm
within the Audubon Society, a traditional conservationist organiza-
tion established in 1896. The Audubon's leadership, however,
rejected the proposal under the argument that "an activist-
oriented litigation effort had no place within this traditional
protectionist organization" (Gottlieb 1993:138).
Outside of the United States, the Audubon Society's failure to
exhibit predicted floodgate behavior finds a parallel in the
lackluster response of Indian groups to a far-reaching liberalization
of standing and outright encouragement of citizen suits on the part
of that country's supreme court (Epp 1998). The paucity of rights
litigation in India is further puzzling in light of the existence of a
wealth of Indian civic associations with ample material capacity to
bring and support civil rights litigation (Epp 1998). In explanation,
Epp highlights the impact of fragmentation among Indian civil
rights organizations, their excessive dependence on charismatic
leaders, and the structure of the Indian legal profession. But, at
least with respect to Indian women's groups, he offers that the
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marginality of litigation has been, in part, the result of the groups'
failure to appreciate its "potentially great importance" (1998:108).
In other words, the groups have lacked desire, rather than the
capacity to litigate.
Moving beyond public interest litigation, Sellers (1995) has
documented reluctance on the part of proponents of development
projects in France and Germany, relative to the United States, to
advance their agendas through the courts, notwithstanding their
ample legal and financial capacity to litigate. Sellers attributes this
phenomenon primarily to differences in the incentives that
builders in the European and American cases face: European
construction firms have both more to gain from close cooperation
with the more insulated, corporatist, official networks of Europe
and more to lose if they do not cooperate. The differences in the
relevant incentive structure derive in turn from the divergent
"institutional and normative constraints" and alternative "tradi-
tions of public law" in which European and American developers
operate (1995:493).
The common denominator across the examples above is a
reluctance to exercise available and seemingly promising oppor-
tunities to litigate. While this is puzzling when viewed from a
pluralist perspective, it is consistent with the sociolegal perspective
described in the next section.
Partnership and Litigation
In his seminal analysis of relational influences on litigation,
Macaulay (1963) observed that the most commonly litigated
business contract disputes are those brought by terminated
franchise owners who have no future relationship to jeopardize.
Ongoing business relations are incompatible with litigation because
"[t]o file a suit or even to threaten to do so is to imply that the
situation of the parties has changed from one in which their
interests are congruent-hence the original agreement-to one
that is fraught with conflict" (Lempert & Sanders 1986:228). Even
in the business world, which is ostensibly built on purely economic
(and highly competitive!) calculations, there appears to be an
expectation of reasonably shared interests as a precondition for
trade. Litigation explicitly contradicts this assumption, and therein
lies its incompatibility with all manner of partnership relations.
As employed here, the term partnership can, but need not,
connote a formal agreement of any sort. Instead, it stands for a
joint enterprise linking two or more people in pursuit of aggregate
.rather than individual goals. The enterprise at the center of such
partnerships may be a family, friendship, business, or, as argued
HeinOnline -- 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 464 2003
Morag-Levine 465
here, a nation. Though clearly different in their goals and the
nature of the attachments they embody, a condition of membership
in all such collective constructs is a willingness to subsume
pertinent individual goals to those of the relevant partnership.
Close personal contact is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for such partnership relations; rather, the decisive
element is the expectation of congruence between interests, or a
sharing of a common identity or membership within a larger entity.
As such, the concept of partnership, as employed here, does
not overlap with "the principle of relational distance," which
argues that there exists an inverse correlation between the degree
of closeness between a set of parties and the likelihood that a
dispute between them will come before a court (Black 1976).
Although partnership relations frequently entail close personal
contact, the meaning of the relationship and the extent that it
depends on assumptions of shared interests distinguish partner-
ships from other relational structures. The difference between
relational closeness and partnership may be clarified through
instances of relational closeness without partnership, and, con-
versely, of partnership independent of personal relations. An
example of interpersonal and professional relations that are devoid
of such partnership and thus compatible with litigation is the close
and ongoing contact between environmental and business interest
groups and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As
Coglianese (1996) shows, in apparent contradiction of the principle
of relational distance, litigation is a regular fixture of ongoing and
quite personal relationships between these groups and the agency.
Rather than "a last-resort strategy reserved for outsiders,"
litigation in the EPA is "a legitimate institutional process for
carrying on business as usual" (1996:759). Coglianese argues that
this difference results primarily from the relatively unobtrusive and
bargaining-friendly nature of litigation against the EPA. But, in
addition, he points out the need for a more nuanced analysis of the
compatibility of different categories of relationships with litigation.
The partnership framework offered here would suggest that the
coexistence of litigation with ongoing relations in this adminis-
trative context is made possible by the absence of an assumption of
converging interests, or institutional norms of partnership,
between interest groups and the EPA.'
The converse-partnership relations devoid of personal
connection appears to account for the often-noted consensualism
1 Litigation by groups against the EPA and other administrative agencies can also
constitute a cooperative strategy when it aims to provide the agency with political cover for
controversial policies or additional resources (O'Leary 1993:117; Rosenberg 1991). In such
instances, there exists a confluence of interests between agencies and groups, but no
partnership.
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that characterizes dispute resolution practices in Japan. The
Japanese propensity to bypass litigation in favor of extrajudicial
(and less adversarial) modes of dispute resolution has been
attributed alternatively to cultural factors (Kawashima 1963) and
to institutional capacity. On the cultural side stand those who argue
that a deeply embedded aversion to all manner of overt conflict-a
view of litigation as a moral and social wrong-renders the
Japanese reluctant to litigate even when suing is within their means
and self-interest would seem to dictate in its favor. On the other
side stand those who reject culture as an independent explanation,
arguing that such theories implicitly (and implausibly) assume the
relative prevalence of seemingly irrational or hyper-altruistic
behavior in Japan. Accordingly, they refer dismissively to "the
myth of the reluctant litigant" (Haley 1978), instead attributing the
Japanese pattern to a scarcity of lawyers and other institutional and
structural constraints (e.g., Haley 1978; Ramseyer 1988).
In an effort to bridge this division, Hamilton and Sanders
(1992) put neither culture nor institutions at the center, high-
lighting instead the structure of relations. Compared to the United
States, Japanese relations are marked by greater hierarchy and
solidarity, and prevalent understandings of individual responsi-
bility and mutual obligation vary in a similar fashion:
In the United States, the person tends to be perceived by self and
others as an individual whose identity and sense of self stand
apart from the group or the community; in Japan, the person
tends to be perceived by self and others as a social participant
whose identity is in large part defined by social relationships.
(Hamilton & Sanders 1992:49)
In the Japanese context, these social relations refer to
membership in the larger "group or community"-an entity
extending well beyond one's immediate circle. As such, the
apparent paradox of Japanese avoidance of litigation is puzzling
only if one fails to recognize that these non-face-to-face associations
may be partnership relations nevertheless.
Particularly important in this regard is not simply the decision
not to litigate, but also more fundamental processes of injury
definition and perception. Japan's more contextual conceptions of
the individual, it appears, help shape the manner in which people
assign responsibility and blame in the first place. In making this
argument, Hamilton and Sanders (1992) build on the insight that
litigation is but the end point of a multi-step process of dispute
transformation ranging from an initial perception of injury
("naming") to the attribution of responsibility ("blaming") and
finally to the articulation of demands for legal redress ("claiming")
(Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat 1980-1981). For this reason, the roots of
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disputing differences more visibly lie in varying propensities to
name and voice injuries.
Partnerships affect the trajectory of potential disputes most
evidently at the claiming stage because people who articulate a
separate interest jeopardize their partner status. But unless we opt
to view all partnerships as strictly instrumental means of pursuing
exogenously derived interests, partnerships also affect the way in
which individuals understand their interests. The meaning of a
potentially injurious action is not strictly a function of some objective
measure of harm but is conditioned by the identity of the actors and
the nature of the relations between them; naming and claiming
processes are inevitably interconnected, because what counts as an
injury is in large measure defined by what ought to count as such
within particular relational frameworks. Consider the example of
children picking fruit off my backyard trees within a close-knit
community. The reason I avoid confrontation with them is not
transparent to the outside observer. Perhaps I am aggravated, but
take no action so as not to harm neighborly relations; alternatively, I
may be neutral or even pleased at the opportunity to share with my
neighbors' children, invited or uninvited. In contrast, I would
almost certainly perceive uninvited sharing initiated by strangers as
an affront, whether I chose to confront it or not.
Engel (1984) shows how this phenomenon might lead to
differences in patterns of disputing between old-timers and
newcomers in a rural Midwestern county. For the most part, those
in Engel's study who responded to personal injuries with tort
lawsuits were outsiders to the community whose reliance on
litigation in part was due to their exclusion from relational
networks, which insiders could access in lieu of judicial interven-
tion. More profoundly, however, outsiders were more willing to
bring personal injury lawsuits because they construed as remedi-
able legal violations events that insiders attributed to inevitable
accidents and personal bad luck. (At the same time, established
members of the community had little compunction about bringing
lawsuits concerning contract violations against outsiders.) Thus
differences in legal claiming originated with divergent construc-
tions of injury, responsibility, and appropriate redress.
Under axiomatic pluralist understandings regarding the
absence of partnership between political groups and the state,
there would be little reason to assume the relevance of parallel
processes of injury (or problem) definition and notions of
appropriate redress to groups' decisions to litigate. In contrast, if
one allows for variation in group definition under alternative
systems-and over time-the parallelism (or its absence) between
factors conditioning individual and group-level litigation become a
matter for empirical inquiry.
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Corporatism, Pluralism, and Relational Transformation
For American political science after World War II, the pluralist
tradition "became both the empirical account and normative vision
of American politics" (Petracca 1992:5). Within this account, the
historical processes behind the ascendance of the pluralist para-
digm were pushed aside, together with the paradigm's relative
novelty. But as a number of historical works suggest, competitive
and adversarial interest groups are of relatively recent vintage,
even in the United States. During the first decade of the twentieth
century, the word 'interests' was regularly printed with a capital I
and uttered in tones of moral outrage," and "as late as the 1920s in
the United States, the organized pursuit of group interests was hotly
condemned" (Clemens 1997:7). This condemnation reproached
the use of politics to achieve sectarian goals rather than the
common good, which was viewed as the proper end of politics. The
beginnings of alternative, group-based conceptions of the state in
American political science date at least to Bentley (1967 [1908]).
But it was the rise of European fascism during the 1930s that
brought home the evident dangers of the "national partnership
state" and moved the reigning American political paradigm from
metaphysical conceptions of national unity into a "a buzzing,
bewildering plurality of groups" (Rodgers 1987:178). In the
process, "interests" transformed from "a mud-stained term of
opprobrium" into "the whole of politics" (Rodgers 1987:178).
Until this transformation, domestic political organizations had
operated in a vastly different ideological environment regarding
their proper relationship with state institutions. The United States
of the Progressive Era could not properly be termed corporatist,
but it nevertheless shared with the corporatist paradigm a view of
the state as protector of the common good, and of political
organizations as its partner in this endeavor. The history of groups
created during that era, such as the Sierra Club, spans a
transformation of this ideology that changed the structure of their
relationship with the state. The link between this structural change
and the group's subsequent turn to litigation is the focus of the
analysis below.
If historical distance creates the illusion in the United States of
an unbroken pluralist heritage, the recentness of the shift in Israel
has allowed contemporary observers to witness it firsthand. A civil
society, autonomous from the state and its institutions, can hardly
be said to have existed in Israel until the 1980s (Migdal 1993).
As late as 1993, Israeli political scientists described the Israeli
political arena as one in which "groups do not provide a key link
between the people and their government and groups do not
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compete with one another" (Arian 1993:185). Instead, organized
interests exhibited deference to "the national interest over the
needs of the individual; the commitment to pursue the welfare of
the nation and to make individual sacrifices in order to advance
collective ends" (Yishai 1991:362).
This pattern changed during the 1990s with the establishment
of thousands of new associations whose agendas were independent
from and, at times, even adverse to those of the state (Peretz &
Doron 1997). An important impetus behind the rapid growth in
the number of Israeli associations was the initiative, guidance, and,
most important, funding provided by American (often Jewish)
foundations, of which the most significant has been the New Israel
Fund (NIF). Through its support for the Association for Civil
Rights in Israel (ACRI) and other such groups, the NIF sought to
increase reliance-on litigation as one of its primary goals. 2 In the
environmental sector, the SPNI's existence pre-dated this pluralist
transformation, providing a case comparable to that of the Sierra
Club in the United States and making it an ideal candidate for a
study of the relationship between corporatist partnership ideolo-
gies (and their decline) and interest groups' propensity to litigate.
Located on opposite sides of the globe and established almost
sixty years apart (the Sierra Club was created in 1892, SPNI in
1954), these two groups nevertheless evolved along similar
trajectories. Intimately linked at their inception to the political
establishments of their respective countries, the Sierra Club and
SPNI shared a similarly consensualist orientation for decades after
their founding. This was most evident in the cooperative tenor of
relations between the two groups and state administrative agencies;
essentially absent from their organizational repertoires was not
only litigation but also most other forms of overt challenge to
governmental policy. Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the
Sierra Club gradually assumed an increasingly adversarial stance in
its dealings with administrative agencies, and by the end of the
1960s it began to bring its disputes with these agencies before the
courts. SPNI underwent largely similar processes of transformation
during the 1990s.
As the most established and financially secure conservationist
groups in their respective countries, they were nominally the best
positioned to make use of new opportunities for litigation, as these
arose. If the change in legal opportunities were the primary factor
2 In an effort begun in the mid-1980s to help staff these organizations and create a
cadre of Israeli civil rights attorneys, the NIF annually sends recent graduates of Israeli law
schools to the United States under a program that combines advanced legal education with
internships at various public interest law groups. Upon their return, these attorneys are
funded for one year, during which they are expected to work within a public interest
organization in Israel.
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influencing litigation behavior, one would have expected estab-
lished, well-funded organizations such as these to be the ones
taking up the gauntlet as soon as they acquired standing. The
extent to which they resisted, equivocated, or rushed to embrace
the adversarial strategies made possible by the opportunity
structures of their newly pluralist political environment can
illuminate the respective place of both external and internal
barriers, in preventing these organizations from legally challenging
agencies until then.
Institutional Transformation in the Sierra Club: 1892-1972
Under the title "New Standing for the Environment," the
Sierra Club Bulletin in 1973 credited a then-recent rise in
environmental lawsuits to the Scenic Hudson case (Cannon
1973:14). The 1965 case, the article went on to explain, had
provided the "breakthrough for the Club and all environmenta-
lists" (Cannon 1973:14). Earlier, "the Club's standing to sue was
continually and vigorously challenged by the defendants, and
federal agencies were free to ignore conservationist challenges to
their decisions" (Cannon 1973:14). With this barrier removed, "the
Sierra Club was quick to broaden its strategy, and within a few
years after Storm King, the Club was actively paralleling its
traditional legislative programs with enforcement proceedings in
the courts" (Cannon 1973:14).
Accounts such as this one, offered by members of the groups
themselves, helped entrench the floodgate model as an empirical
reality in the minds of both environmental activists and observers
of the environmental movement. Against the pluralist backdrop of
1970s environmental politics, unfavorable standing doctrines
offered a reasonable retrospective explanation for what by then
looked like a perplexing delay in the employment of such suits. But
this post hoc reasoning may reveal more about the Sierra Club's
redefined mission and organizational identity than it does about its
propensity to litigate in an earlier era. For the Club's standing to be
"continually... challenged by the defendants," there would have
had to be multiple attempts at litigation prior to Scenic Hudson. This
was not the case. With one exception, a 1962 case that it agreed to
join, it was only after Scenic Hudson that the Club began to bring
conservationist lawsuits. This is not to suggest that the path to the
court was unimpeded prior to Scenic Hudson, as the failure of the
1962 case on standing grounds attests. But this failure cannot per
se suffice to explain the absence of any other Sierra Club lawsuits
up to this point. As such, it remains to be explored what stopped
the Sierra Club from launching such challenges earlier on. The
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following section documents the activities and internal debates of
the Sierra Club from its founding to the early 1970s in order to
understand the roots of its early refraining from litigation, as well
as its later embrace of the strategy.
3
1892: A Sierra's "Alpine Club"
During the 1880s, Joachim Henry Senger, a German-born
professor at the University of California, took steps to organize "an
alpine club for mountain lovers" (Wilkins 1995:184). Senger later
invited John Muir to join in forming the organization that in 1892
would become the Sierra Club (Wilkins 1995:184).
"Alpine clubs" devoted to various forms of outdoors recreation
proliferated in nineteenth-century Germany, in parallel with
various scientific societies devoted to the study of nature. Both
the recreation-oriented and the scientific groups were expressions
of the larger Naturschutz, or nature protection movement, which
grew and flourished with the financial and political support of the
recently unified German state. The Naturschutz movement also
aided directly in state-building in its push for the creation of state
conservationist agencies, the first of which was established in
Bavaria during the 1860s (Dominick 1992).
The latter third of the nineteenth century was a period of
ongoing U.S.-German exchange, particularly through American
students who traveled to Germany in large numbers for their
graduate studies (Rodgers 1998). They and German 6migr~s such
as Senger were most likely the conduit through which local hiking
and mountain climbing organizations sprouted, beginning with the
Williamson Alpine Club in 1863. Other such groups followed in
Portland (Maine), Colorado Springs, and Boston, where the
Appalachian Mountain Club was established in 1875 (Jones
1965). The Sierra Club built on these earlier precedents but
innovated in its explicit inclusion of conservation within its
organizational goals. This emphasis derived in large part from
the influence of John Muir.
John Muir, who arrived in California in 1868, spent much of
the following decade traveling and writing about the geology, flora,
Analysis of the Club's development tip to the 1950s relies (primarily) on two books
written by historians closely associated with the organization: Jones (1965) and especially
Cohen (1988). The account of the Club's development between 1950 and 1972 relies, in
addition to Cohen and other secondary sources, on a review of the Sierra Club Bulletin
during that period, in addition to the following volumes in the Sierra Club Oral History
Series: Sierra Club President, 1991-1992: The Club, The Legal Defense Fund, and Leadership
Issues, 1984-1993, by Phillip Berry, 1997; Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, by
David Brower, 1980; Mountaineer, Lavyer Environmentalist, by Richard Leonard, 1975; and
Sierra Club Executive Director: The Evolving Club and the Environmental Movement, by Michael
McCloskey, 1983.
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and awe-inspiring beauty of the Sierra Nevada mountains. During
that time, he also forged a close friendship with Robert Underwood
Johnson, an editor for Century Magazine. In 1889, they jointly
promoted the creation of a national park in the territory
surrounding the California state park that had been established
in Yosemite Valley during the 1860s. In 1891, Johnson encouraged
Muir and other of his associates to form a "defense association" for
the protection of the newly created Yellowstone and Yosemite
national parks (Jones 1965:8). Muir's interest in this goal led him
to respond favorably to Senger's invitation in spring 1892 that he
"was greatly interested in the formation of an Alpine club" (Jones
1965:9).
The group thus emerged from the overlapping agendas of two
sets of leaders. The first, including Senger and Warren Olney (a
lawyer who would later become the mayor of Oakland, California),
was primarily interested in camaraderie and outdoor recreation.
The second, composed of John Muir (and supported by Robert
Underwood Johnson), was committed to the protection of
Yosemite National Park, whose mountains the solitary Muir
generally preferred to hike alone. These divergent agendas are
reflected in the Club's articles of incorporation, which Olney
drafted and twenty-seven charter members signed on June 4,
1892. These articles outline a hierarchy of three organizational
goals:
To explore, enjoy and render accessible the mountain regions of
the Pacific Coast; to publish authentic information concerning
them; and to enlist the support and cooperation of the people
and the government in preserving the forests and other natural
features of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. (Cohen 1988:9)
The central agenda of the conservationist movement during
the Progressive Era was a greater federal role in the protection of
scenic areas, through the creation of federal forest reserves and
new federal agencies to oversee them (Andrews 1999:144). Within
this framework, private conservationist organizations existed to
promote the formation of such administrative bodies and to
provide them with assistance after their establishment. The
prevalence of natural scientists among the Sierra Club's charter
members and those who joined it during its first two decades was
relevant to this task. They had expertise about nature, which
presumably legitimated their role as consultants to government on
matters of conservation. In similar fashion, hiking provided a
different kind of claim to expertise through firsthand familiarity
with the areas that group members sought to protect. The
recreational and conservationist goals were thus complementary,
though for the majority of those who joined the Sierra Club during
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the 1890s, and for decades hence, it was the hiking and social
opportunities that seemed to hold the greatest appeal.
Following the example of similar groups, such as the
Appalachian Mountain Club, the Sierra Club initiated in 1901 a
tradition of annual "high trips" to Yosemite and other destinations
in the Sierra Nevada mountains (Fox 1985; Cohen 1988). The
outings, which lasted for several weeks, soon became a central
aspect of organizational identity, traditions, and leadership deve-
lopment. The spirit of these events, and the extent to which they
defined the experience of membership in the Club, are captured in
one participant's account:
The Sierra Club has great and noble purposes, for which we
honor it, but besides these its name has come to mean an ideal to
us. It means comradeship and chivalry, simplicity and joyousness,
and the care-free life of the open. (Fox 1985:120)
The outdoorsy camaraderie sat easily with the group's underlying
consensualist orientation in public policy matters.
The group's consensualism was aided by the governing
concept of "mixed use," which during this time served as the
organizing principle regarding federal management of forest
reserves. Federal forest reserves were to serve a diverse, at times
competing, set of purposes: logging, grazing, mining, watershed
protection, wildlife habitat, and recreation. The federal govern-
ment's task in this connection was to balance immediate economic
interests in development against long-term resource management
concerns (Andrews 1999). This formulation, by definition, allowed
and even required compromise between economic development
and nature preservation agendas under an overarching utilitarian
rationale. As Muir himself wrote in 1895, forests, "like perennial
fountains, may be made to yield a sure harvest of timber, while at
the same time all their far-reaching uses may be maintained
unimpaired" (Muir 1895). Yet within a few months of the Sierra
Club's establishment, the hidden strains within the mixed-use
framework and the limits of consensual conservationist work would
become evident to Muir, first in connection with tourist develop-
ment in Yosemite Valley, and then most dramatically in the Hetch
Hetchy controversy.
Yosemite Valley: National Conservation and Local "Interests"
As discussed, Progressive Era conservationists saw their goal in
terms of expanding the role of the federal government in natural
resource management, relative to the place of state and local
authority. Thus whereas the federal government was the implicit
partner, two sets of potential adversaries existed: commercial
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interests that wanted to develop the areas and state and local
governments that often supported such development. This conflict
quickly became evident in connection with the defense of Yosemite
National Park, the first and primary conservationist purpose Muir
envisioned for the Sierra Club. The campaign ultimately resulted
in the State of California ceding its control over Yosemite Valley to
the federal government.
Under the management of a state commission appointed to
oversee Yosemite Valley, animal grazing and other land uses
directed at serving a growing number of tourists were a source of
increasing concern to conservationists by the 1880s. Among the
most vocal critics of these policies was Charles D. Robinson, an
artist and Sierra Club charter member who, within weeks of the
Club's incorporation, urged that it take action on the issue by
lobbying the California legislature to cede control of the area that
would then become a national park. Whereas Muir was sympa-
thetic to Robinson's agenda, the Club's board of directors initially
refused to go along (Jones 1965:58). As Club leaders such as Vice
President Warren Olney explained, "the Club would lose prestige
if it seemed to resist California's aspirations" (Cohen 1988:14).
Rather than pushing for the Valley's recession, it was preferable for
the Club to opt for a consultative role and a cooperative
relationship with the state commission (Jones 1965; Cohen
1988). A self-described "crank" who successfully pushed for a
legislative investigation of the commission during the 1880s,
Robinson soon lost patience with the Sierra Club's lackluster
response. 4 In October 1892, he wrote: "The Sierra Club . . . has a
mere existence for its own pleasure-that is all .... In short the
Club, like the state, is nerveless and dead regarding Yosemite"
(Jones 1965:57). Robinson's determination helped put the reces-
sion issue on the reluctant Club's agenda, but his "devil may care
right or wrong style" failed to gain a following (Jones 1965:37). 5
Toward the end of the 1890s, the idea of a unified, federally
managed Yosemite park gained broader support within the state,
and with it, in the Sierra Club. Muir secured President Roosevelt's
approval of the plan when the two hiked together in Yosemite
Valley in 1903. When the issue finally came before the California
state legislature in 1905, Muir's personal friendship with E. H.
Harriman, the president of the Southern Pacific Railroad, helped
4 Robinson is reported to have said, "it takes a crank to move the world, and I would
rather be a crank than a nonentity" (Jones 1965:37).
5 The reference to Robinson's "grand devil may care right or wrong style" appears in
a letter from Muir to Johnson, September 13, 1889 (Muir 1889, cited in Sierra Club Bulletin
1944).
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win that company's all-important support for the recession bill that
narrowly passed that year (Jones 1965:72; Holliday 1972:10).
Here as with its other conservation activities during its first
decade, the Sierra Club's efforts were confined to private lobbying
built in large part on the personal connections and insider political
status of Club leaders (Fox 1985). In a move emblematic of the
Sierra Club's self-conception as a partner, or perhaps even an
agent, of governmental agencies, the Club (with financial support
from the earlier mentioned Yosemite Commission) established a
Yosemite office and staffed it with an attendant who provided
information to tourists while keeping an eye on local economic
development activity (Cohen 1988). In 1903, President Roosevelt
paid tribute to this model, and to the Club, in a speech where he
noted how some of the functions of the California Forest
Commission were later "replaced by the Sierra Club, a club which
has done much on the Pacific Coast to perpetuate the spirit of the
explorer and pioneer" (Roosevelt 1903, cited in Jones 1965:2 1). If
up to this point the Club's insider identity and conservationist goals
appeared to reconcile, the Hetch Hetchy controversy would soon
put this organizational formula to a severe test.
Hetch Hetchy: Insiders and Outsiders
At the center of the conflict was a City of San Francisco plan to
dam the Tuolumne River at Hetch Hetchy as means of providing
water and hydroelectric power to the city. Located north of
Yosemite Valley on national parkland, the Hetch Hetchy valley was
chosen because of its high walls and narrow exit, the very features
that were said to distinguish it as one of the most dramatically
scenic spots in the Sierra Nevada mountains. The reservoir, its
supporters argued, would not only ensure a stable and relatively
inexpensive source of water to the city but would also free it of
powerful water and energy monopolies (Cohen 1988:22). The plan
gained momentum in the wake of the San Francisco earthquake
and the subsequent fire, whose widespread damage some blamed
on the city's inadequate water supply (Turner 1991:67).
Led by Muir, the Club's board of directors came out in emphatic
opposition to the project in fall 1907 and wrote to the Secretary of
the Interior (whose permit was necessary for the project to proceed):
"The vital interests of the nation at large" ought not be sacrificed so
as "to save a few dollars for local interests"(Jones 1965:96). In
casting the issue in terms of a conflict between the national interest
in preservation and local economic "interests" -note the plur-
al-those in the Sierra Club who headed the campaign hoped to
gain a national constituency for their effort. As a byproduct of this
strategy, taking a stand on this issue became a test of loyalties for
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those in the Club for whom local, rather than national, affiliation was
of ultimate concern. Leading the opposition was Vice President
Olney, who held to the belief that public policy considerations
justified Hetch Hetchy's sacrifice and that the Club ought not to
mobilize against the plan. Personally disheartened by growing
dissent within the Club, Muir seriously considered resigning his
presidency, as well as his membership (Cohen 1988:26).
In 1909, Muir's allies in the Club formed a separate
organization, the Society for the Preservation of National Parks,
to spearhead a national Hetch Hetchy Valley preservation
campaign. Muir was the new society's president, but Will Colby, a
mining lawyer who would play a leading role in the Sierra Club for
years to come, carried most of the work, much of it behind the
scenes because Colby's law firm was headed by a leading supporter
of the dam (Jones 1965:98). A number of Sierra Club directors
likewise took part, and the group's advisory council included
nationally known conservationists from across the country. Rather
than the Sierra Club, it was under the name of the Society that
Muir and his associates campaigned against the Hetch Hetchy dam,
primarily through pamphlets that they broadly distributed to
congressmen, newspaper editors, women's clubs, and cooperating
conservation organizations across the country.
Against the very real threat that internal disagreement on
Hetch Hetchy would split the organization, the Society was
conceived as means of insulating the Sierra Club from the
campaign. But the strategy failed when, ignoring the formal
distinction between the Sierra Club and the Society (which shared
both offices and Muir's presidency), the San Francisco Call, in a
December 1909 article headlined "Enemies Harming the City,"
accused the Sierra Club of "lending its influence to an attack
designed to do the city incalculable harm" (San Francisco Call
1909a:9-10, cited in Jones 1965:109). Prompted by Olney, within a
few days the Call published a second article quoting leaders in the
Sierra Club "who have taken emphatic exception to any attempt to
commit the organization to a policy antagonistic to the City" (San
Francisco Call 1909b:17-18, cited in Jones 1965:109). No longer
able to avoid a showdown, the board of directors decided to put the
Hetch Hetchy question to the entire membership for a vote to
"settle it once and for all" (Jones 1965:111). Of the 750 ballots
returned (out of 1,300 members), 589 sided with the "desire that
the Hetch Hetchy Valley should remain intact and unaltered,"
whereas 161 "favored the use of Hetch Hetchy as a reservoir for a
future water supply for San Francisco" (Jones 1965:115). Follow-
ing their defeat, 50 of the members who supported the reservoir
resigned from the Club; Olney was among them (Cohen 1988:27).
Backed by this mandate, Muir and Colby redoubled their letter-
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writing campaigns and other efforts aimed at building a national
coalition against the project. In addition, they proposed a
compromise in the form of an alternative location for the reservoir
(Cohen 1988:29)-a solution very much in keeping with the era's
conception of conservationist organizations as consultant to
government on how to balance development and conservation.
Ultimately, however, it was all for naught. In December 1913,
Congress passed and President Wilson signed into law a bill
allowing for the construction of the Hetch Hetchy dam inside
Yosemite National Park.
In retrospect, the prominence of the Hetch Hetchy controversy
colors the early years of the Sierra Club as more politically active
than the historical record supports, as the Club's activism on Hetch
Hetchy proved to be the exception to the pattern that it would
establish. The group did not again engage in public campaign
against a proposed development project until the 1950s, and its
activist stance on Hetch Hetchy appeared to be largely the product
of Muir's force of personality. Robinson and Muir, the men who
pushed the early Sierra Club toward a more politically adversarial
role, were after a fashion, "outsiders" already set apart through
personal temperament and geographical distance (both lived
outside the San Francisco-Oakland area). This contrasts with the
situation of a man such as Colby, who -notwithstanding his strong
commitment to the cause-avoided a more visible role in order to
protect his professional position and relationships.
Few if any of those who first formed and joined the Sierra Club
expected that their obligations as members or leaders of this Club
would put them in conflict with professional, political, or social
allies. As indicated by the articles of incorporation that they
drafted, they came to the Club primarily to "enjoy" the mountains
and each other's company, and to "solicit the cooperation of the
people" on behalf of conservation (Cohen 1988:9). The assumption
that such cooperation would indeed be forthcoming depended, in
turn, on their own understanding of conservation as an efficient,
development-friendly agenda supportive of, rather than anta-
gonistic to, economic development goals.6 When Hetch Hetchy put
6 The historian Samuel P Hays describes the essence of the conservation movement
during that time as "rational planning to promote efficient development and use of all
natural resources. The idea of efficiency drew these federal scientists from one resource
task to another, from specific programs to comprehensive concepts. It molded the policies
which they proposed, their administrative techniques, and their relations with Congress
and the public . . . .The popular view that in a fit of pessimism they withdrew vast areas of
public lands from present use for future development does not stand examination. In fact,
they bitterly opposed those who sought to withdraw resources from commercial
development. They displayed that deep sense of hope which pervaded all those at the
turn of the century for whom science and technology were revealing visions of an
abundant future" (1959:2-3).
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this consensualist assumption to the test, Sierra Club members
were confronted with a choice between what until then were
complementary objects of allegiance and sources of personal and
public identity.
1915-1946: The Partnership Era
Muir died in 1914, a year following the Hetch Hetchy defeat.
With the passing of Muir and many of the college professors who
founded the Club, a new generation of leaders, comprising mostly
engineers and businessmen, came to the helm, rising mostly
through the Club's outdoor activities. The World War I era was
associated with a stronger nationalist focus within the American
conservationist movement, in and out of the Sierra Club. In 1919,
the Sierra Club Bulletin quoted with approval President Roosevelt's
statement (first made in 1908 at the Governors Conference on
Conservation) that "the conservation of our national resources is
but part of another and greater problem ... the problem of
national efficiency, the patriotic duty of insuring the safety and
continuance of the nation" (Sierra Club Bulletin 1919:432).
By this time, federal conservationist agencies had already been
established, partially through the efforts of groups such as the
Sierra Club. The Forest Service was established under the U.S.
Department of Agriculture in 1905, and the National Park Service
(NPS) was established in 1916. The NPS's first director was
Stephen Mather, a mountaineer, Sierra Club member, and close
friend of a number of Club leaders (Cohen 1988:45). The Club's
relations with the Forest Service were even tighter, as the Forest
Service between the 1920s and early 1950s relied on the Club to
lobby for increased congressional appropriations and to represent
its interests before other federal agencies, commodity users, the
state, and local interests (Schrepfer 1997:126). In a practice that
spoke to the nature of the link between the Club and these
agencies, the Forest Service and NPS chief administrators served
during the interwar years as honorary vice presidents of the Sierra
Club, while Sierra Club directors regularly served on the Forest
Service's advisory board (Schrepfer 1997:125). This partnership
relationship was further cemented through professional connec-
tions and personal friendships forged on mountain trails. The
leaders of the Sierra Club, the Forest Service, and the NPS
belonged to the same social milieu, knew and trusted each other,
and shared common understandings of the meaning of conserva-
tion and its compatibility with economic development goals. This
manner of cooperative, interest group-agency relations accorded
with Progressive Era conceptions of administration as an apolitical,
expertise-driven process. Under this model, citizen groups, rather
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than advancing particularistic interests, served to assist agencies by
offering specific forms of expertise-as yet devoid of the "capture"
stigma that would soon attach to this mode of interconnection.
Although the Club did undertake some conservationist work,
primarily through behind-the-scenes lobbying for the expansion of
national parks, its activities during the interwar period focused
primarily on its first, and in the minds of its members, primary
goal: "to explore, enjoy, and render accessible" (Cohen 1988:56).
1946-1968: Transformation Pains
As mentioned before, European fascism helped precipitate a
shift toward greater pluralism in the United States. This entailed a
twofold process in which the previously condemned "interests"
were legitimated, while the earlier cooperative relationship
between groups and the state became an object of criticism.
Intertwined with this was the rise of post-New Deal challenges to
the progressive belief in administrative autonomy and govern-
mental expertise. The individual most responsible for bringing
these ideas into the Club was David Brower, a longtime outings
leader who became editor of the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1946.
Almost immediately afterward, Bulletin readers could detect a
shift in emphasis away from an earlier focus on hiking and
recreation and toward greater attention to wilderness protection
(Cohen 1988:123). More important, the tone with regard to
conservation issues became newly strident. When the Forest
Service announced in 1946 a proposal to develop a ski resort in
the pristine San Gorgonio Primitive Area in southern California,
Brower asked rhetorically in a Bulletin article, "Can a conservation
organization place the construction of ski facilities, or any
development above wilderness?" (Cohen 1988:86-87). At one
level, the question pertained to the group's stance in a particular
controversy, but more fundamentally, it asked rhetorically what it
meant to be a conservation organization, seeking to redefine the
term as inherently more activist and confrontational than it had
been in previous decades.
Brower had used the article to take public a division regarding
this proposed site within the Club's board of directors. Opposing a
plan that the Forest Service had proposed cut against established
partnership relations between the groups. Moreover, prominent
members of the board did not see ski resorts as incompatible with
the Sierra Club's conservationist goals.
The Club's president during that time was Bestor Robinson. A
prominent California lawyer and enthusiastic outdoorsman, Robin-
son had joined the Club in 1929 and first became director of the
Club in 1933, a position he would occupy until 1963 (Cohen
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1988:67). Robinson was a longtime member of the Forest Service
Advisory Committee and was an avid skier. His view on the San
Gorgonio matter was that the Club had no business opposing the
Forest Service's plan. As he would years later explain, "I had no use
at all for the argument that there was something superior in the
wilderness use and that the [resort] skiers should be considered a
second class use" (Cohen 1988:85). By the late 1950s, Robinson and
Brower, who would become the Club's first executive director in
1952, stood for opposite conceptions of the organization's identity.
The San Gorgonio controversy resulted in a compromise
whereby the board of directors suggested an alternative site for a
Sierra ski resort, Mineral King, a place that they described as
"(p)robably the most spectacular site for commercial development
on the west slope of the Sierra" (Cohen 1988:88). The practice of
offering an alternative site dated in the Club to the Hetch Hetchy
controversy, where it had failed. The method was tied to a
conception of the role of the organization as an expert on how to
balance development and preservation, rather than an absolutist
advocate on conservation. The outcome ultimately fit with the Club's
longstanding cooperative relationship with the Forest Service;
yet in retrospect, the San Gorgonio story foreshadowed impend-
ing transformations in relations between the two organizations.
Two-and-a-half decades later, the Sierra Club would challenge the
planned resort in Mineral King before the U.S. Supreme Court
(Sierra Club v. Morton 1972).
By the early 1950s, two interrelated developments would
combine to seriously strain relations between the Club and the
Forest Service: (1) increased logging within the national forests
(prompted by a rise in demand for lumber in the wake of the
postwar housing boom and a change in the Forest Service
leadership and personnel) (Cohen 1988:188; Schrepfer 1997);
and (2) a change in the public's expectations regarding the role
that conservationist groups ought to play and the legitimacy of
close connections between government agencies and such groups,
i.e., the rise of the "capture" thesis. This change was brought home
to the Sierra Club when it found itself under attack for its
complacency regarding Forest Service plans to log a small stand of
Jeffrey pine in a scenic area near Mammoth Lakes in the eastern
Sierra.
When local residents protested that the logging would destroy
the area's scenic value and harm the local tourist industry, the
Forest Service defended the operation as sanitary logging-the
removal of disease-prone trees that could be hazardous to hikers.
Challenging this claim, a local resident by the name of John
Haddaway retained an independent entomologist who declared
the forest healthier than most. Charging the Forest Service with
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"strategic deceit," Haddaway blasted the agency's close connection
with conservation groups such as the Sierra Club as infiltration
aimed at averting trouble "at the start by a soothing word"
(Schrepfer 1997:133). What was earlier a political ideal of close
cooperation between agencies and the state was beginning to
transform into a public relations liability.
Stung by the criticism, Brower soon took up Haddaway's cause.
Suspecting that the Forest Service was under the influence of a
local lumber company, Brower described its proffered justification
for the logging as "blatant dishonesty" and publicly circulated a
history of the controversy and local residents' accusations (Schrep-
fer 1997:133, 1983:106). This was a fundamental departure from
the tone and tenor of relations between the Forest Service and the
Club until then. A number of Club directors responded with
evident dismay. Notwithstanding general agreement with Brower
on the questionable wisdom of logging the particular site or the
practice of "sanitary logging" as such, a number of directors took
strong issue with Brower's insinuation that the Forest Service acted
deceitfully or out of ill motivation. Alex Hilderband, one such
director, found it necessary to come to the defense of the Forest
Service's "able, sincere, and dedicated" men and warned Brower
not to intervene in matters of policy where substantial disagree-
ment existed among professional experts (Schrepfer 1983:106). As
a form of compromise, the board of directors conveyed to the
Forest Service its "serious doubts as to the wisdom or the necessity
of the degree of cutting proposed" (Schrepfer 1997:137). Ignoring
this advice, the Forest Service went ahead with the logging plan,
further reinforcing the budding militancy of Brower and others
within the Club's professional staff and deepening the division
between them and the much more conflict-averse board of
directors.
As these transformations were happening behind the scenes,
the Sierra Club was helping to orchestrate a high-profile public
campaign against a government-planned development, its first
since the by-then mythologized Hetch Hetchy days (Gottlieb
1993:41). As at Hetch Hetchy, at issue was a dam that threatened
dramatic landscapes within the boundaries of a national park
(Dinosaur National Monument). It was largely for the purpose of
coordinating this campaign that Brower was appointed executive
director in 1952. Brower's efforts in this campaign were divided
into two parts: the first was aimed to familiarize and educate the
public with the area at stake through rafting trips in which
hundreds took part as well as through films and photographs; the
second, more explicitly political, consisted of a national letter-
writing campaign, newspaper ads, congressional lobbying, and
testimony before congressional hearings.
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A number of factors seemingly converged to encourage the
Sierra Club to adopt a more visible and activist role in this instance.
The first was the change not only in view of the role of groups in
the postwar era, but also a revived attention to conservation
(Gottlieb 1993). The second was the obvious parallel to Hetch
Hetchy, which evoked symbolic resonance in the organization, such
that even those who did not relish the fight would have had a hard
time opposing Sierra Club involvement. Finally, it was important
that the agency in charge of the project was the federal Bureau of
Reclamation, as it had had little prior connection with the Sierra
Club (as opposed to the Club's longstanding partner, the Forest
Service). The latter fact made it easier for Brower to challenge the
Bureau of Reclamation in public, most dramatically during a
congressional hearing where, in sharp departure from the
organization's longstanding deferential stance, he challenged the
Bureau of Reclamation's own supporting calculations regarding
rates of evaporation from the planned reservoirs (Turner
1991:145).
This incident notwithstanding, the overall tenor of the
campaign remained remarkably nonadversarial (even congres-
sional opponents made note of Brower's politeness). The campaign
ended with a compromise that Brower would come to regret:
Following the longstanding pattern, the Club gave its consent to
the construction of a dam in Glen Canyon, a remote area in
southern Utah perhaps more spectacular than Dinosaur in the eyes
of the relatively few conservationists who had ventured far enough
to see it (Schrepfer 1983:104). However, Glen Canyon lacked the
protective status of a national park. As such, Club director Alex
Hilderbrand, an engineer in charge of underground research for
the Standard Oil Company, argued that the Club should not
oppose "sound reclamation projects that did not invade the parks
or wilderness area" (Schrepfer 1983:105). Decades later, Hildebrand
held to this view:
You have to compromise. The merit is rarely all on one side even
though some people like to pretend it is. The case for building
Glen was much better than the case for building Dinosaur. The
case against Glen didn't involve existing national parks or
monuments. (Cohen 1998:178)
Growing, but until then largely hidden, tensions between the
directors and Brower came into the open in 1959. In December
that year, the Board made public its displeasure with Brower's
increasingly confrontational posture when-under the heading
"Relations with Agencies"-it issued the following two guidelines:
(1) those speaking on behalf of the Club were not to make
statements that directly or implicitly criticized "the motives,
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integrity, or competence of an official or bureau"; and (2) when
reporting on controversial conservation matters, both sides of the
issue ought to be represented (Cohen 1988:237). The move
appeared to reflect a mixture of concerns: personal loyalty on the
part of some directors to the Forest Service and individuals within
it; underlying consensual sensibilities regarding proper organiza-
tional "manners"; and, most explicitly, the worry that in assuming a
more contentiously political identity, the Club risked having the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoke its tax-exempt status under
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 (which the
Supreme Court upheld in 1954) (Cohen 1988:163-64).
Partially to avert a change in its tax status, the Club joined in
creating a separate lobbying organization, Trustees for Conserva-
tion, under the logic that it could take on more explicitly political
functions without compromising the fiscal position of the Club as
such. Importantly, however, it appears that by that time there was
at least some constituency within the Club's membership advoca-
ting a more activist conservationist orientation. Out of concern that
these members would question the organization's decision to hide
behind such a separate organizational front, Richard Leonard,
then the Club's president, explained in a Bulletin article that "with
no privileged status to protect," the Trustees could "take the
message of conservationists directly and vigorously to Congress"
(Leonard 1955:3, cited in Cohen 1988:166). Yet protecting the
Club's tax-exempt status seems to have been only part of the
rationale behind this move. The goal of ensuring donors' capacity
to deduct contributions to the Club from their taxes would have
equally been served had the Club adopted Brower's preferred
solution: officially registering as a lobbyist (losing its tax status)
while channeling donations, earmarked for activities other than
lobbying, to a separate foundation. Instead, two considerations
appeared to favor the Trustees' option: (1) the protection it offered
did not require the Club to take on the (politically tainting) identity
of a lobbyist or interest group; and (2) the solution restricted
Brower's formal capacity to engage in lobbying activities while
being compensated by the Club (Cohen 1988:165-66). 7
The long-anticipated IRS action finally came to pass in 1966,
triggered by the Club's mobilization against yet another dam-this
7 Notwithstanding the creation of the Trustees, the Club created in 1960 a separate
fundraising organization, the Sierra Club Foundation, in the event that contributions to the
Club as such could no longer be deducted. Michael McCloskey provided the following
explanation as to the strategic considerations behind the creation of the foundation: "At
that time, there was a notion that we should have three institutions proceeding in a
somewhat parallel way... The thought was that the trustees would play a very out front
role in overt lobbying, that the club would take some risks in doing lobbying, but it would
not set out to lose its tax deductible status, but that if we did, the foundation had been
formed and was there to be used" (McCloskey 1983:135).
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time at Marble Bridge near the Grand Canyon. In taking this
measure, however, the IRS unintentionally provided the Club with
a public relations and membership recruitment boon (Gottlieb
1993:44). Against the backdrop of the Civil Rights movement and
Vietnam War protest, the Johnson Administration's displeasure
with the Club helped the organization reshape its by-now politically
detrimental "insider" status and consensualist reputation.
The Club's Grand Canyon campaign marked a distinctive shift
away from the compromise-oriented problem definitions of the
past toward a more absolutist conservationist agenda. As noted,
ever since Hetch Hetchy, the Sierra Club had coupled its
opposition to particular projects with its consent (or even its own
proposals) for alternative sites that were often themselves located
within scenic locales outside protected national park boundaries.
Departing from this precedent, Brower led the Club to adopt a
position opposing all hydroelectric facilities in scenic locales and
backed this goal with direct action tactics and a more strident
rhetorical tone (Gottlieb 1993:44). The public appeal of this more
contentiously political style was evident in exponential membership
growth in the aftermath of the Grand Canyon campaign, as the
membership roster grew from 39,000 in June 1966 to 78,000 in
June 1969 (Cohen 1988:362). Among some of the Club's older
members and leaders, however, there was great resistance toward
the nature and level of conflicts that absolutist conservationist
agendas of this type by necessity entailed.
A dispute over a plan by Northern California's Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (PG&E) to build a cluster of nuclear power
plants on the central California coast precipitated a dramatic
showdown between competing factions in the Club (Turner
1991:179). Persuaded that "it was not the role of the Club to fight
progress," some Club leaders worked closely with PG&E to find a
suitable alternative location, ultimately settling on Diablo Canyon
on a deserted stretch of the central California coast (Cohen
1988:369). The board of directors endorsed the Diablo site in May
1966 as consistent with the "club's long tradition, and its most
effective practice, of urging the selection of alternative sites"
(Cohen 1988:367). The compromise, the Club's president William
Siri further argued, would also encourage PG&E to continue
consulting with the Club in the future (Cohen 1988:367). However,
vociferous dissent within the board resulted in a decision to put out
the Diablo Canyon plan for the entire membership to ratify during
the upcoming elections for the board of directors.
Seventy percent of the membership voted to uphold the Diablo
Canyon plan; at the same time, a number of new directors who
were opposed to the plan were elected to the board, which
subsequently passed a resolution withdrawing its support. An all-
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out battle ensued over the Club's obligation to abide by its earlier
commitment and over the trustworthiness of PG&E (Cohen
1988:370). Well beyond the particular issue at stake, the Diablo
Canyon dispute catalyzed long-brewing divisions on proper
organizational goals and tone, Brower's leadership style, and the
Club's place and response to a rapidly rising environmental
movement. When the dust settled, PG&E (which never depended
on the Club's consent in the first place) built the Diablo Canyon
nuclear power plant, and Brower lost his executive director
position (Turner 1991).
As noted before, tensions between the board of directors and
Brower over matters of both substance and style were evident at
least since the board passed the 1959 "Relations with Agencies"
resolution, dubbed by Brower the "gag rule." These tensions
would persist and deepen over the next decade in a process that
would ultimately lead to Brower's departure. 8 It was under the
watch of the next executive director, Michael McCloskey, that-
with the structure of the Club's relations with government agencies
fundamentally altered -litigation would become a defining orga-
nizational instrument for the Sierra Club.
The Club in Court
From Warren Olney and Will Colby on, lawyers served visible
leadership positions in the Club and made their expertise available
on matters such as contracts, copyright, tax, and the like. Building
on this model, Richard Leonard, a San Francisco lawyer and past
president of the Sierra Club, established in 1963 the Conservation
Law Society, an organization devoted to the provision of low-cost
legal services to conservationists. But the Society was not conceived
as an instrument of conservationist litigation, and Leonard himself
was known for his criticism of some of Brower's confrontational
methods (Cohen 1988:392). Both the legal committee and the
Society, however, were later retooled and drawn upon to launch
Sierra Club v. Morton (1972), the case that redefined the Sierra
Club's identity and cast it as a major environmental law player
(Turner 1990:13). Generous financial assistance from the Ford
Foundation contributed to this transformation, most importantly in
facilitating the 1970 establishment of the Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund. But in view of the organization's longstanding access to legal
8 Brower's opponents focused their criticism on his allegedly poor fiscal management
and autocratic leadership style (Cohen 1988). McCloskey explained the conflict in terms of
a history of conflict between Brower and old-guard directors that led him to adopt a
"damn-the-torpedoes attitude" rather than the "give and take" attitude necessary for
successful leadership of a membership organization such as the Sierra Club (McCloskey
1983:95).
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expertise, it was apparently not for lack of legal and financial
capacity that the Club prior to the 1960s chose not to litigate.
The first time the Club took part in a conservationist suit was in
1962, when it joined a legal challenge that another conservationist
organization, the National Parks Association initiated in defense of
Rainbow Bridge National Monument against rising waters from
the Glen Canyon Dam. The failure of that suit, largely on lack of
standing grounds, is among the primary pieces of evidence
supporting the floodgate model (Sierra Club Bulletin 1962). But
the significance of this example cannot be understood in isolation
from the anomalous circumstances leading to the case. The
National Parks Association, rather than the Sierra Club, was the
central plaintiff in the Rainbow Bridge lawsuit. Brower succeeded
in gaining the board of directors' consent to the Club's participa-
tion in the suit, but the decision was seen at the time as "an unusual
action given the outlook of the board, for it stepped up the degree
to which the Club was willing to directly confront government
officials." 9 Furthermore, working in Brower's favor was the fact
that Glen Canyon, the source of the threat to Rainbow Bridge, had
been built with the Club's consent as part of the Dinosaur
campaign compromise. And as part of that deal, the U.S.
Department of the Interior had pledged "to take whatever steps
were necessary to protect" Rainbow Bridge (Schrepfer 1983:105).
The legitimacy of adversarial political or legal action was still
unresolved within the Sierra Club of the early 1960s. In an effort to
persuade reluctant factions of the need to move in a more activist
direction, the Sierra Club Bulletin published in 1964 an article
entitled "Controversy as a Saving Force." That article argued that
[t]he role of the private conservation organization is the will-
ingness to accept controversy as an important part of its activity
and to take advantage of basic philosophical controversy to stimu-
late a public concern that will combat both agency complacency
and public apathy. (Sierra Club Bulletin 1964:15)
At the same time, the article was careful to acknowledge the
cost that such conflict might exact of those accustomed to more
cooperative modes of interaction. Against this backdrop, the
Second Circuit was preparing to hear an appeal from an ad hoc
group of New York citizens in the Scenic Hudson case.
David Sive, a New York attorney and chairman of the Atlantic
chapter of the Club, was on the team of lawyers who shepherded
the Scenic Hudson appeal, but the Club itself avoided any visible
involvement in the controversy until after the legal victory
9 This is according to Phil Berry, who was close to Brower at the time and would later
play pivotal role in the Club's legal transformation (Cohen 1988:240).
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(according to Brower, he allocated $1,500 to help Sive stay on the
case, only to be scolded by the board; see Brower 1989). However,
things changed rapidly after that. By the time the Federal Power
Commission held a second set of hearings in 1966 (following the
Second Circuit's remand), the Club submitted a brief on the beauty
of the Hudson River at Storm King, and Brower testified before
the commission (Cohen 1988:392).
The Scenic Hudson case indeed proved to be a turning point in
the evolution of the Sierra Club, but for reasons deeper than the
broadening of standing as such. Against the backdrop of a
nationally publicized (and celebrity-studded) campaign to stop
Consolidated Edison from building the power plant at Storm King,
the case helped legitimate an emergent model of adversarial
environmental activism. In swinging the courthouse doors wide
open, Judge Hays's Scenic Hudson opinion (1965) had made it more
difficult for those in the Club who were determined, until then, to
hold on to the earlier cooperative model.
Scenic Hudson and the social movement-like mobilization
behind that case were not, of course, freestanding events; they
were part of an era of growing antiwar protest and civil rights
activism. With this a new environmentalism came to the fore that
differed from its conservationist precursor in both the scope of its
agenda and its explicitly confrontational stance. Whereas estab-
lished environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Audubon
Society had long restricted their missions to the protection of
natural resources and scenic landscape (showing little interest in
problems of pollution or the built urban environment), concerns
about risk from chemicals crystallized after the 1962 publication
of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring-were central to the rise of 1960s
environmental activism. The new environmentalism challenged
not only the older organization's aesthetic and/or economic-
resource framed problem definitions but also the consensual style
with which these definitions intertwined. Unlike resource con-
servation, or even the preservation of beautiful scenery, protection
of human health was a goal inherently less amenable to
compromise. In the wake of Scenic Hudson, the Club attracted
many lawyers who began to bring lawsuits on the Club's behalf on a
pro bono basis. At the same time, the Club's volunteer legal
committee, which until then was exclusively occupied by the legal
business of the Club, began to take on a number of conservation
issues, including the Forest Service's revival of a plan to construct a
ski resort in Mineral King (McCloskey 1983:141-42).10
10 By 1967, a staff member could write "Last year, the New York lawyers began
joining the club at such a rate that I was afraid we were going to become the New York Bar
Association" (Schrepfer 1983:164).
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Mineral King is an area at the southern end of the Sierra near
Sequoia National Park that the Club, back in 1947, had suggested
as an acceptable alternative for a proposed ski resort in the San
Gorgonio mountains. In 1965, the Forest Service returned to that
idea and published a request for proposals from developers with an
interest in the project. For the following year there ensued within
the Club a rancorous debate on whether the Club was obligated, by
virtue of its earlier compromise, to go along with the plan (Turner
1990:9). But in the end, a majority on the board opted to oppose
the planned resort (McCloskey 1983:169)." 1
In 1968, the board authorized "appropriate legal proceedings to
protect the Mineral King area and Sequoia National Park" (Cohen
1988:392, emphasis added). The Forest Service-the Club's
traditional partner-would be its opponent in its first substantial
lawsuit. Gaining time was the suit's main strategic rationale,
according to McCloskey:
We did hope that the litigation would produce a delay to give us
time to gear up political action. At the time we filed the suit, we
were on the ropes. The Forest Service was about ready to issue
permits and start construction. (McCloskey 1983:168)
The Club offered a number of procedural challenges to the
project, but the brief's primary novelty derived from its failure to
assert any vested interest, on the part of the Club or its members, as
grounds for standing. Instead, casting itself as a "private attorney
general" of the type the Scenic Hudson court endorsed, the Club
argued that it was entitled to bring the suit by virtue of its
conservationist organizational purpose. In opting for this rather
risky strategy, the Club sought to position itself as a representative
of a larger public interest, rather than the parochial interests of its
members. As McCloskey recounted, "We clearly didn't think we
were going to all of this trouble just on behalf of ourselves or the
Sierra Club. We had the sense that we were the agents of the
natural world in pursuing its welfare" (1983:172-73). But the
strategy backfired when (against prevailing expectations) the
Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's denial of the Club's
standing for lack of showing that the ski resort would in any fashion
harm the Club or its members (Sierra Club v. Morton 1972).12
11 The board unified in opposition to the project once the Forest Service issued the
Disney Corporation in October 1966 a permit to build what the company promised to be
"the world's largest ski resort," a development several orders of magnitude greater than
what the 1947 Sierra Club had in mind (Turner 1990:9).
12 The Club later amended its complaint, adding detailed arguments on likely injury
to the Club (as well as adding individual plaintiffs with more specific recreational or
property interests in the area). The political and legal battle would drag on for another five
years; in 1978, the area was added to Sequoia National Park, and a ski resort in Mineral
King was never built (Turner 1990:23).
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The case, especially Justice Douglas's dissenting view of the
Club as a proper advocate for the rights of trees and nature as such,
was a symbolic victory and a major publicity boon, helping to
project an aggressive organizational identity much at odds with the
old Sierra Club. Inside the organization, however, significant
ambivalence remained. On the one hand was pressure (supported
by a large majority of the membership) to follow the more
adversarial and activist example set by new environmental move-
ment groups; on the other hand was a much smaller (but
influential) group of older members and leaders deeply discom-
fited by the Club's changing orientation. McCloskey addressed this
concern in a 1971 editorial:
The changing nature of the Sierra Club's program is producing
some distinctive challenges.... Our legislative proposals, in the
main, reflect a growing conflict over priorities in society. This
conflict pits the Club, and much of the environmental movement,
in a contest of will and strength against most elements of the
American economy and the government agencies allied with
them .... Sometimes, these industries, and even our members
associated with them, accuse us of being "irresponsible and
unfactual." (McCloskey 1971)
These divisions may have played a part in the decision to create
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund as a separate organization,
with its own board of trustees, budget, and staff. Tax considera-
tions, the conventional explanation for this decision, undoubtedly
played a part in this decision (Turner 1995). But the relationship
between the tax considerations and the separation of the main
organization from the Defense Fund was indirect. The Sierra Club
had already created a separate Sierra Club Foundation after its tax-
exempt status was rescinded in order to facilitate the collection of
tax-deductible money for nonpolitical purposes. The Foundation
provided a potential alternative means of ensuring that donations
to the Legal Defense Fund were tax deductible. But the
Foundation was overseen by a board of trustees comprising former
presidents of the Sierra Club who were steeped in earlier
consensualist conceptions of the Club and its mission (McCloskey
1983:136). When asked why the Defense Fund was spun off as a
separate organization, McCloskey (who was executive director at
the time of the decision) did not mention tax considerations. He
instead attributed the decision to a desire to prevent a "bottleneck
of our decision making processes" (McCloskey 1983:143), an
apparent reference to the consensualist proclivities of the Sierra
Club Foundation. The Legal Defense Fund reflected and im-
portantly stimulated greater emphasis on both litigation and
lobbying; nevertheless, the Club as a whole "remained reactive
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and often wary of the developments reshaping the mainstream
groups during the early 1970s" (Gottlieb 1993:149).
In 1971, the Club conducted a national survey of its members
regarding their background, reasons for joining, and attitudes on
matters of organizational style and purpose. In response to the
question "[a]re lawsuits and lobbying appropriate Club activities?"
two-thirds of the respondents strongly agreed, whereas only 5%
thought litigation inappropriate (Coombs 1972:38). 13 Of the Club's
140,000 members at the time, about half the members had
belonged for two years or less; nine percent had joined prior to
1960. Recent members joined to support conservation activities,
while most long-term members originally joined to participate in
outdoor activities. Most likely, it was primarily out of their ranks
that the 5% of the respondents who disapproved of litigation came.
The alienation felt by some such older members at the time is
palpable in a cover note that Alberta Reed Huber, the widow of
past Club president Walter Huber, attached to her answers to a
questionnaire that the Club's History Committee sent her in 1972.
She wrote,
I doubt if my answers will be of any value to you. I am one of the
"oldtimers" who still belong but do not go along with it .... I
have not been in sympathy with the Sierra Club for a number of
years. (Cohen 1988:61)
Mrs. Huber first met her husband on a Sierra Club outing, and
the organization for decades hence was an integral and important
aspect of their lives, but by the early 1970s she and her generation
shared little with the rapidly transforming Sierra Club. As the
following account suggests, old-timers in a similarly transformed
SPNI would, most likely, sympathize.
Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel: From
Corporatism to Quasi-Pluralism
From its inception, the Israeli state was constructed on a political
terrain marked by precarious national (Jewish versus Arab) and
religious (secular versus orthodox) fault lines. Political mobilization
along these divisions was, however, long made rare by the absence of
civil associations standing outside the state and the national
partnership it claimed to represent. A 1979 study of Israeli interest
groups by Yishai (1979) invoked SPNI to epitomize the then-
13 The published results do not specify how opposition to litigation and length of
membership correlated. But the speculation of such a correlation gains support from the
fact that older members (more than the younger ones) expressed support for the idea that
the Club should put greater emphasis on outings than on conservation (Coombs 1972).
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entrenched corporatist culture of Israeli political groups during that
time. The organization, she writes, "prides itself for being one of
'deeds' (i.e. positive actions) rather than of 'pressure' by spreading
the love of nature among many young Israelis" (Yishai 1979:210).
More than two decades late, the same author once again relied on
SPNI to illustrate Israel's drastic pluralist transformation. This
"formerly compliant" group, she writes, is "now applying militant
strategies to counter political decisions" (Yishai 2001:149). On the
eve of its fiftieth anniversary, the SPNI mirrors larger transforma-
tions in Israeli society. It is no longer the corporatist group it once
was, but throughout the 1990s its organizational identity was still in a
process of transformation, with different factions pulling in opposite
directions. The lingering hold of previous partnership relations is
reflected in the relative marginality of litigation in the organization's
strategic repertoire during the 1990s.14
Organizational and Ideological Foundations
During the 1949 meeting of the Israeli Zoological Society, a
German-born professor named Heinrich Mendelssohn suggested
forming a committee for nature protection. Mendelssohn had
arrived in Tel Aviv in 1935, and his work thereafter focused on a
study of bird life in the Huleh wetlands in the northern part of the
country. The area had been targeted for reclamation ever since
the 1920s, and Mendelssohn expressed concern beginning in the
1930s over the loss of this ecologically rich environment. The
reclamation plans kicked into high gear with the establishment of
the state, and it appears that this fact was the immediate impetus
behind Mendelssohn's initiative (Tal 2002:129). The committee
assembled a small number of academics who took upon themselves
the task of advising the Israeli government on matters of
conservation, most importantly the Huleh reclamation plan. But
their proposal for setting aside a subsection of the area as an
untouched nature reserve failed to persuade, and by 1958 the
Huleh was almost completely drained.1 5 Beyond offering its
advice, the Committee invited a group of newspaper journalists
14 This section draws primarily on two historical accounts of SPNI. The first is Alon
Tal's Pollution in the Promised Land (2002). The second is a commemorative booklet that
SPNI published upon its fortieth anniversary (Regev 1993). I rely on the latter source for
two distinct purposes. First, it is a source of historical facts on personalities and
organizational activities; for this purpose I use it as a secondary source. Second, I quote
it as a primary source of evidence on the ways in which the organization views its own
history and seeks to explain itself to the outside world. In addition, the section relies on
newspaper accounts and interviews with three individuals who witnessed some of the
events described.
15 In 1993, the Israeli government announced a plan to reflood the Huleh in an effort
to correct what by then had come to be understood as both an economic and ecological
mistake.
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on a tour of the area, in an effort to draw some public attention to
the issue. But this was the scope of their "public campaign."
Subsequent to this experience, the need for a stronger institutional
and political conservationist presence became evident, and the
Society for the Protection of Nature was born.
Two men led this initiative: Amotz Zahavi, a graduate student
of Mendelssohn's whose research focused earlier on the Huleh
area; and Azariah Alon, a teacher and youth group leader from a
northern kibbutz. Veterans of the 1948 War of Independence, they
both epitomized the Israeli elite of the time. They were the
consummate insiders, and the organization they would create
would be an insider's organization, despite the fact that its mission
and structure were hardly native to Israel. It was the German-born
Mendelssohn who pushed his student Zahavi to create the group
and who shepherded it through its first decade, offering both
crucial financial resources and expertise (Tal 2002).
In undertaking this initiative, Mendelssohn was, most likely,
inspired himself by the ideas and organizational models of the
German Naturschutz movement. The parallels between the German
conservationist movement and SPNI begin with the organization's
use of the term nature protection (Naturschutz) in its name and
continue with its early quasi-administrative functions. Most
important, however, SPNI followed the German model in linking
conservationist ideologies with nationalism. From its earliest days,
at least some within the Naturschutz movement invoked nationalist
rationales in support of conservation. Seeing nationhood as the
bond between a people and its land, the Volkisch strain of the
Naturschutz movement promoted conservation as a duty to protect
"Germanic Nature rather than Nature as a whole" (Dominick
1992:22, emphasis in original). A similar intersection between
nationalist and conservationist ideology marked SPNI's early years.
In 1952, Mendelssohn's Nature Protection Committee joined
members of neighboring Kibbutz Alonim ("oaks" in Hebrew) in
lobbying against the plan to log an old oak grove as part of the
development of a new town. They offered the following argument
in support: "We have sacrificed our efforts and blood so as to
prevent the destruction of these ancient oaks by our Arab
neighbors, there is no justification now that they should be
uprooted by the state of Israel" (Regev 1993:16). Knowing and
loving the land are intertwined duties within the Zionist worldview;
yet the concept of land in this connection is one with a distinct
nationalist thrust. It extends well beyond nature into all that
infuses the Israeli landscape with Jewish national significance,
including archeological sites indicative of Jewish historical roots
and new settlements establishing a renewed Jewish presence. Even
industrial development (long heavily subsidized by the state)
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constitutes part of the combined physical/spiritual entity Israelis
call "the land" (no qualifier needed). In innumerable songs, Israeli
culture celebrates mountains, streams, trees, and flowers, and has
long imbued hiking with a patriotic, at times even paramilitary,
connotation.
This is crucial to understand the inherently nationalist meaning
of SPNI's "nature protection" mission, a raison d'itre that left no
room for conflict with the state through the articulation of a
separate environmental agenda. Since nature mattered only to the
extent that it was nationally incarnated, its protection could hardly
trump developmental projects whose contribution to nation-
building was deemed greater. 16 And because Zionist ideology
imbued "the act of building and transforming the (mostly desert)
environment" with social revolutionary meaning, for decades after
the state's founding, few developmental projects in practice failed
to meet the requisite national contribution threshold (De-Shalit &
Talias 1994:288; Vogel 1999).
1954-1973: The Partnership Years
SPNI's founding convention took place in July 1954 in
Oranim, the kibbutz movement's educational institute near Haifa.
The bulk of those who attended were members of kibbutzim whom
Alon had recruited. In a memo that he circulated in January 1954,
Alon proposed several sets of goals for the new organization,
including recruiting a large number of members who would then
help disseminate nature protection values, most importantly
through active measures to prevent "hunting and destruction of
animals, and injury to trees and plants, especially with respect to
uncommon species; creating public support for the passage of
nature protection legislation; and publishing educational materials"
(Regev 1993:116). 17
The group's organizational style had a distinct, kibbutz-
inspired, informal, nonhierarchical flavor (Tal 2002:133). The
leadership was made up of consummate insiders with extensive
and cross-cutting connections, embedded within the intimate army,
kibbutz, and university networks that were the early Israeli state.
SPNI's membership grew to approximately 15,000 within three
16 Yiftachel and Segal (1998) refer to the symbiosis between environmentalist and
Zionist agendas in Israel in the following terms: "The authorities are interested in these
lands because they are part of the State of Israel and preservation of nature is considered
an Israeli-Jewish value, part and parcel of the national identity 'constructed' in recent
decades . . . . Since the main point is control over lands, emphasizing the state as the absolute
power holder, there is no difference between a military training zone and a natural reserve as
long as the rules for each are given by the state and are enforced" (1998:501).
17 Memo from Azariah Alon to Heinrich Mendelssohn, Amotz Zahavi, and eleven
others, January 5, 1954. Reproduced in Regev (1993:116).
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years of its founding, impressive evidence of the effectiveness of
these networks. But it would be incorrect to see this as indicative of
a groundswell of support for the group's conservationist mission.
Rather, as Zahavi explained, people joined because they, or their
associates, asked them to, as a matter of interpersonal obligation
more than anything else (Regev 1993:25). This fact is central to
understanding the intersection between interpersonal and political
connections within the early Israeli state.
It was through such connections that SPNI first gained the
governmental funding it needed to survive (membership dues
were a symbolic one pound). As it turned out, the Minister of the
Interior, a kibbutz member himself, was a friend of Azariah Alon. A
short meeting between the two sufficed to channel funds from the
Ministry of the Interior to SPNI with little further bureaucratic ado
or governmental oversight (Tal 2002:136). What in retrospect
appears illegal or corrupt was devoid of such connotations during
that time; this manner of clientelistic behavior was characteristic of
Israeli political norms during those days, as SPNI saw itself and was
seen as an integral element of the state itself.
In fact, SPNI functioned during its first decade in a quasi-
administrative capacity. Its primary conservationist activity was
managing inspection centers across the country that it operated
through a cadre of municipally funded "regional workers." The
goal was to protect vegetation and wildlife in scenic locales and
ecologically sensitive areas against damage by hikers and hunters.
"Nature protection" meant protection against damage inflicted by
the Israeli public, not the developmental agendas of the state.
The quasi-administrative model had significant international
precedent. The Sierra Club, as earlier discussed, had assumed a
quasi-administrative function in Yosemite for a short time around
the turn of the twentieth century. The German Naturschutz groups
engaged extensively in similar enforcement practices during the
same era in Bavaria. 18 In parallel with both these precedents, SPNI
lobbied the Israeli government to establish both national nature
reserves and an administrative body to oversee them, a task that
was completed with the 1963 establishment of the Nature Reserve
Authority.
The following few years were marked by very close cooperation
between the two organizations. As was the case for the Sierra Club,
SPNI leaders had a say in the choice of the men chosen to head the
Authority, and Alon (who took over from Zahavi as SPNI's general
18 By 1913, 2,330 "overseers" operated in Bavaria, members of private conserva-
tionist organizations whose "responsibility was to promote a Naturschutz awareness in the
local area, to become familiar with the natural environment of that area, and to warn the
proper authorities if any of Nature's local treasures were threatened" (Dominick 1992:50).
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secretary in 1969) served on the Authority's board between 1964
and 1976. The two organizations, in fact, went as far as to form a
joint entity, named Shahar, under the direction the Authority's
chairman. Their most important joint venture was a campaign
aimed at reversing sharp declines in the population of many
previously numerous species of wildflowers. The two organizations
lobbied successfully in 1965 for the passage of legislation declaring
many varieties of endangered flowers to be protected species.
Backed by this legislation, SPNI set out to redefine the picking of
wildflowers (a common recreational practice until that time) as a
socially unacceptable -even unpatriotic-act through a concerted
educational campaign that quickly and effectively altered relevant
norms and behavior. For decades hence, the successful wildflower
campaign-a quintessential effort at protection against the public,
rather than development interests -epitomized SPNI's identity
and mission within both the organization and the Israeli public's
eye.
With the creation of the Nature Reserve Authority, SPNI
relinquished its quasi-administrative tasks and put education and
hiking at the center of its enterprise. Primarily as means of raising
funds, SPNI initiated an outing program in 1956, which grew
quickly in the next few years. Tapping into the centrality of hiking
within the Zionist culture of that era, SPNI came to lead outdoor
youth movement seminars, military youth core treks, and
eventually public school excursions. SPNI would ultimately
become a primary provider of hiking and field education services
to the Ministry of Education, which in turn provided a substantial
portion of the organization's budget (Bar-David & Tal 1996).
This mode of education was directed first and foremost toward
love of the land, through hands-on knowledge of its geography,
geology, nature, archeology, and military heritage. In undertaking
this educational mission, SPNI relied to a great extent on a rotating
cadre of female soldiers who spent their military service as guides
in SPNI's field schools, a distinctive SPNI institution of that era.
Scattered across the country, the schools were designed to impart
knowledge and love of the land. To the extent that SPNI's
educational mission included a conservationist component during
that time, it was of the anti-flower-picking, anti-littering variety.
In the early 1970s, SPNI was for all intents and purposes a
hiking organization, with a tiny percentage of its budget going
toward conservationist work of any kind (Tal 2002). One of the few
conservationist matters on which it was active at the time revolved
around a power station planned for the base of the Taninim
stream, one of central Israel's few relatively unpolluted waterways.
In response to the proposal, Alon published a position paper
calling for an alternative, less ecologically damaging location, and
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in April 1972, an SPNI rally drew 500 people to the Taninim site,
receiving broad coverage in the Israeli press. As a consequence, the
plant was moved from Taninim to an already polluted stream at
nearby Hadera (Tal 2002). The Hadera location, while protecting
the Taninim stream and its associated nature reserve, nonetheless
mars to this day tens of miles of central Israel's coastline with the
visual impact of its smokestacks, hundreds of feet high.
The controversy centered on the plant's location, not its
construction per se. As noted, similar relocation solutions were the
outcome of a series of Sierra Club campaigns from the mid-1940s
to the mid-1960s, which represented a transitional period toward
the Club's more pluralist identity. The Sierra Club's transition was
more or less complete by 1972, when the Stockholm Conference
on" the Global Environment helped spread the environmental
movement's message across the globe. In SPNI, processes
reminiscent of the Sierra Club two decades before were about to
unfold.
Quasi-Corporatism: 1974-1984
Environmental ideas trickled into Israel during the early 1970s
largely through American and other English-speaking immigrants
and visitors whose numbers increased in the years following the
Six-Day War. A second vehicle was Israel's participation in
international environmental bodies, beginning with the Stockholm
conferences (which Alon attended). In 1973, the Environmental
Protection Service (a forerunner of a later Ministry of the
Environment) was established. 19 Within SPNI, environmental
concerns gained increased attention with the establishment of a
new Department of Nature Conservation in 1974.
Tensions between SPNI's longstanding nationalist-conserva-
tionist agenda and what some within it viewed as infiltrating
American ideologies came to the fore when a group of SPNI guides
in a Sinai field school sought to publish a booklet containing
Hebrew translations of excerpts from foundational texts of the
American environmental movement. Their request was summarily
rejected by Alon because, as he noted, the texts slated for inclusion
were "not of ours," and by implication, constituted an American
import with little relevance to SPNI's "love of the land" agenda.
19 Like scores of other countries essentially devoid of domestic environmental
constituencies, Israel sent a delegation to the Stockholm conference, held in June 1972.
Later that summer, the decision to create a new agency that would coordinate and
supervise environmental affairs in Israel was made, and one year later an Environmental
Protection Service was established under the auspices of the Prime Minister's office
(Mandelbaum 1977).
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The group published the booklet on its own, in what may have
been the first such instance in Israel, on recycled paper. But the
dispute marked an end to an era in which internal agreement
within SPNI regarding what is and is "not of ours" could be
assumed.
More directly relevant to the issue of litigation was Alon's
opposition to forging an ongoing professional connection between
SPNI and an attorney who could advise it on matters of
conservation (and presumably help undertake some litigation).
Lawyers, he argued, were not what SPNI was about. 20 Others
within the group, however, had begun to see it otherwise.
The 1980s saw the entrance onto the Israeli scene of multiple
and diverse new social and political organizations, partially through
initiative, guidance, and, most important, financial resources
offered by American foundations, both Jewish and non-Jewish.
Inspired by American conceptions of pluralist democracy, these
foundations worked to create the conditions for a more autono-
mous Israeli civil society. The emergence of American-modeled
public interest groups oriented toward litigation was intimately tied
to this development.
SPNI began to bring conservationist litigation during the early
1980s. In 1982, the group brought a suit against a planned West
Bank settlement slated for an area that had been declared a nature
reserve by the Jordanian authorities. While opposition to West
Bank settlements was not the motivation behind the suit (Tal 2002),
the location may have made it an easier target for litigation in that it
fell outside the quickly disappearing Israeli political consensus.
Furthermore, in bringing the suit, SPNI was advancing the view
that territory occupied in the 1967 war was within its purview, and
may thus have been serving a nationalist goal at the same time that
it challenged a particular development in the area.
Quasi-Pluralism: 1984-1994
The decade between 1984 and 1994 was marked by deep
organizational ambivalence over appropriate goals and tactics for
the organization. SPNI emerged during that time as an increas-
ingly visible organization, with an environmentalist rather than
national-conservationist agenda. Nevertheless, in controversies
entailing direct confrontation with a substantial state or kibbutz
interest, it tended to follow public sentiment rather than lead (Tal
2002). This was also true of what came to be seen as SPNI's
crowning glory, the Voice of America (VOA) campaign.
20 Interview with attorney Naomi Weil, June 10, 1997.
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In 1985, the Israeli government agreed to a Reagan Admin-
istration request to build a massive radio transmitter (the world's
largest) in the southern Arava Desert. The station was intended to
transmit broadcasts to the far reaches of the Soviet Union and to
counteract Soviet broadcast jamming. Slated to occupy three
square miles, the station was to include 47 antennas, some 650
feet high. The project was financially lucrative for Israel, and, more
important, was seen as an important contribution to Israeli-
American relations. SPNI's initial response was limited to a request
that the project's environmental impact be considered prior to the
approval of the project.
In SPNI between 1985 and 1990, opposition to the VOA plan
was essentially a one-woman campaign. Bilhah Givon, a long-time
SPNI employee, worked closely with the local citizens on the issue,
while SPNI's leadership vacillated. Her persistent pressure
ultimately paid off when in 1990 SPNI announced its outright
opposition to the project (Tal 2002:165). Actual mobilization
against the project had begun from among residents in the villages
around the planned area, who were concerned primarily about
potential danger from electromagnetic radiation. In 1989, they
brought a suit that sought to disqualify the siting decision on
procedural grounds, arguing that the VOA transmitter was not a
national issue and should only be reviewed at a local or district
planning council (where the influence of the affected residents was
presumably greater). The Israeli Supreme Court rejected the claim
in February 1990.
Once on board, SPNI took two crucially important moves. The
first was to file a second lawsuit together with the local residents,
this time challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact
process. In addition to the lawsuit itself, an important strategy of
SPNI was to enlist environmental groups in the United States and
elsewhere in the world to mobilize against the plan, ultimately
recruiting over one hundred ten groups. In a 1991 decision, the
Israeli Supreme Court temporarily enjoined the project pending
the completion of a more complete Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) (Rabinovich 1991). This bought SPNI and its
allied American nongovernmental organizations crucial time,
during which SPNI's executive director traveled to the United
States and addressed a Congressional committee on the VOA issue.
Environmental concerns, coupled with a changed geopolitical
context in the post-Cold War era, ultimately persuaded the Clinton
Administration to cancel the plan.
The case marked a transition for SPNI. For the first time, the
organization had set out against what was defined as a national
interest by the government, and its use of both litigation and
alliances with outside groups set this case in opposition to the
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organization's longstanding tradition of national partnership. Yet
the state interest that was being challenged was hardly a matter of
consensus; the Israeli Ministry of the Environment and 74 Knesset
members had actively declared their opposition to the plan.2 1
Internal divisions that had delayed SPNI's action in this case
did not disappear with the VOA controversy, and in 1991-1992, a
new state-sponsored development project divided competing
factions in SPNI. The Trans-Israel Highway was a planned three
hundred-kilometer toll road expected to cut across much of the
country. Though the project would profoundly alter the Israeli
landscape and the direction of its future land use and transporta-
tion policies, it quickly passed through the various pertinent
planning approvals with little public attention or debate. Through
the first half of the 1990s, the road was a political nonissue in Israel,
as few there thought to challenge what the government termed a
"national project" with important transportation, economic, and
social benefits.
SPNI's then executive director, Yoav Sagi, was present when
the National Planning Commission called for the preparation of a
master plan for the road, but Sagi made little effort to slow the
planning process in 1992. The following year, SPNI's own
landscape preservation think tank offered qualified support for
the plan. Within SPNI's Department of Nature Conservation
(DNC), there was significant frustration with this policy. In fact, the
head of the Department met with the board of directors of the
Israel Union for Environmental Defense (IUED) and encouraged
them to take action against the road (Tal 2002).
The turn to IUED was indicative of the loss of SPNI's
monopoly on conservation issues in the Israeli political environ-
ment. Among the manifestations of Israel's associational revolution
at the start of the 1990s was a sharp rise in the number of
environmentally active organizations (Bar-David & Tal 1996). Of
these, it was the NRDC-modeled IUED that most directly
challenged SPNI's previous hegemony-in parallel fashion to the
influence that groups such as the EDF and the NRDC earlier had
on the Sierra Club. The impact of changes on the outside was, as in
the case of the Sierra Club, divisions on the inside. Tensions
between the DNC and SPNI's leadership intensified, with some in
the DNC threatening to resign. They won this battle in 1995 when
SPNI announced its opposition to the road and began to mobilize
against it, but too late for it to have any effect (Tal 2002:178).
SPNI marked its fortieth anniversary in 1994 in the shadow of
these divisions. A commemorative historical account that SPNI
21 SPNI press release, February 19, 1993 (in Hebrew, on file with author).
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published in honor of the occasion offered the following summary
of the group's conservationist work:
SPNI is not a cabal of insane extremists screaming against the
message of progress. Its power derives from its ability to partake
of the nation, contribute to improvements in the standard of
living and advance new ideas and initiatives. From this it derives
its right to carry the fight for [the preservation of] the landscape,
the environment and nature. (Regev 1993:74)
The choice of language suggests that there was at this point at
least some public constituency for more adversarial modes of
activism. In a newspaper article devoted to the anniversary, Alon
responded to the claim that the group's affiliation with the
establishment impeded its capacity to act by saying, "I don't know
that it's a bad thing. I think that part of our success is that we work
together with the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], government
ministries and others. We never wanted to play alone, but to
involve others" (Collins 1994:3)
1995-1997: Transformation Pains
A sharp reduction in the Ministry of Education's support for
SPNI's school programs, together with growing competition from
other outings and tourist services, left the organization during the
mid-1990s with a severe deficit and an urgent need to reduce its
operating costs. But the crisis also presented an opportunity for
long-submerged matters of organizational goals and identity to be
placed squarely on the table. The result was a far-reaching
organizational overhaul, massive budget cuts, and the elimination
of approximately 200 SPNI staff positions (close to 20% of the staff)
(SPNI 2002). A major focus of this reform consisted of a drastic
revamping of SPNI's 26 field schools -institutions with deep
symbolic resonance for many Israelis within and outside SPNI. In
what some would perceive as a direct attack on the organization's
commitment to imparting "love of the land," the reformers
imposed new efficiency-based criteria on the management of these
schools, subordinating their mission to a paramount environmental
protection goal (SPNI 1996).
Tensions between these competing "love of land" and
environmental organizational visions came to a head during the
1997 elections for the board of directors. Until that time, elections
to the board had been a sleepy event about which few of the
thousands of SPNI's members cared and even fewer bothered to
take part. But the elections were turned into a referendum on the
organization's future course with the departure from SPNI (in
August 1997) of the "Uri Mimon scouting clubs."
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The clubs were initially created by a group of friends as a
memorial for a soldier killed in the 1973 war, a tribute deeply
rooted in Israel's "love of land" culture. In 1976, they officially
affiliated with SPNI, which created a new Youth Division to manage
them. At the time of SPNI's fortieth anniversary, at least some in
the organization considered the clubs among the "most appealing,
colorful, unique and successful SPNI enterprises" (Regev 1993:75).22
Yet in 1997, the Mimon clubs withdrew from SPNI and re-
established themselves as a separate organization. The split followed
a mix of financial, organizational, and ideological complaints. At
the most fundamental level, however, their departure was the
product of the ideological distance that the SPNI leadership had
traveled from its nationalist conservationist origins. As they
explained, "the Green goals of SPNI and the educational mission
of the Scouting Clubs" were not the same (Rinat 1997). With a
promise "to act on behalf of SPNI's true goals, first among them
the educational activities such as those provided by the hiking
clubs," a slate of candidates sympathetic to the scouting clubs
competed during the 1997 elections (Rinat 1997).
Under the name "SPNI Faithful," the incumbent leadership
cast itself as defender of the group's authentic values and traditions
against economically motivated developers-highlighting connec-
tions between its opponents and real estate and business
interests-in particular Dror Hoter-Yishai, then the head of the
Israeli bar association and a man with extensive development
interests. It was largely through that angle that the Israeli media,
and through it the larger public, framed and responded to the
controversy. Hoter-Yishai, who was among the original founders of
the Mimon clubs and had maintained close connections with the
project ever since, vehemently denied that his real estate interests
had anything to do with the clubs' departure from SPNI and their
role in the elections-a claim backed by long list of scientists,
educators, and long-time Mimon club members who mobilized
behind the slate (Rinat 1997).
On the day of the elections in January 1998, thousands of SPNI
members came to Tel Aviv from all parts of the country to cast their
ballots, 90% of them in support of the incumbent SPNI Faithful slate
(Collins 1998). One interpretation of this showing would be to see it
as indicative of a groundswell of popular support for SPNI's
newfound environmental agenda. But environmental consciousness
probably had little to do with the scope of the response. Rather, it
appears that a sense of affiliation with SPNI's older nationalist self
22 During the first part of 1997, 300 separate hiking groups, comprising 3,700
members, took part in this project (SPNI 1997).
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was the impetus that led many to come. This is perhaps best evident
in the active mobilization of the kibbutz movement on behalf of the
cause. For Israelis ambivalent about weakening national bonds,
SPNI remained a powerful symbol of a younger, unified, and to
some, more idealistic state. SPNI was able to tap into this symbolic
capital even if, ironically, it was the Mimon clubs whose vision better
accorded with the SPNI's original statist identity.
SPNI's annual report for 1997, published in the midst of this
internal struggle, depicts an organization at the center of environ-
mental controversies spanning the Red Sea, the Dead Sea,
Jerusalem's forests, and Tel Aviv's beaches. The same report, for
the first time, mentions lawsuits brought during the previous year.
They concerned issues pertaining to the management of nature
reserves, open space preservation, and, primarily, coastal private
development (SPNI 1997:7). Nevertheless, litigation remains a
relatively rare instrument within SPNI. In 1998, the SPNI board
rejected a proposal by the DNC to create an internal legal division
and opted instead to continue the practice of retaining outside
attorneys to represent SPNI in legal proceedings. The argument
offered was that in-house lawyers would not be able to match the
service provided by the high-caliber external attorneys on whom
SPNI relied.2 3 But the decision also offered the SPNI board a tool
to ensure that the DNC would give careful financial and other
consideration each time it weighed an option to sue. As Tal writes,
"[t]he fact that SPNI's legal advisers remain external and charge
per case cannot help but influence the alacrity with which the
organization initiates litigation" (2002:152).
The decision amounted to a conscious choice not to develop
the support structures that would allow greater integration of
litigation strategies into the organization. It suggests that notwith-
standing far more distant relations between SPNI and the state,
SPNI's transformation to pluralism is not, as of yet, complete.
Partners No More
The importance of both favorable legal structures and material
resources to the capacity of groups to litigate is hardly in doubt.
Rather than challenging this argument, this article takes issue with
the implicit notion that, given the necessary legal and material
resources, groups will invariably opt to litigate to promote their
agendas. Instead, it finds the root of variations in the litigation
propensity of groups in the structure of relations between such
23 Interview with Emily Silverman, SPNI Department of Nature Conservation, Tel
Aviv, July 1999.
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organizations and the state. The contemporary term interest group
assumes as a matter of definition the organization's pluralist
identity and legal-adversarial inclination. But to answer why
organizations earlier failed to litigate, we must first understand
whether and when they in fact became such "interest groups."
Through parallel historical analysis of institutional transformation
within these two originally consensualist conservationist organiza-
tions, this study challenges the implicit notion that outside the
locked courthouse gates there have long stood interest groups
ready and eager to litigate.
As discussed in the introduction, the understanding that the
structure of interpersonal relations (rather than the capacity for
litigation as such) affects the transformation of disputes is an
uncontroversial tenet of sociolegal scholarship. In much greater
dispute is the claim that relations-whether at the individual or
collective level-that are not face-to-face can similarly explain
reluctance to litigate. This is because in these cases it is harder to
understand where the value of such relations may lie, or what the
source of their capacity to define personal and political obligations
might be. Willingness to subsume organizational aims to a larger
common good is nonsensical under a pluralist system in which the
collective interest is itself defined through unbridled pursuit of
individual and group goals. Within the pluralist framework,
absence of requisite institutional conditions, such as appropriate
standing rules, is thus a more persuasive and internally consistent
explanation for the historical absence of litigation from the
strategic repertoire of most groups. Expectations of such sacrifice
are, however, integral to the partnership frameworks within which
corporatist groups operate.
The power of such expectations is particularly salient within
the Israeli context. Discussions of Israeli environmental history
often invoke a popular Zionist pioneering song by the poet Nathan
Alterman: "We shall build you, our beloved country, and make you
beautiful; we shall cover you with a robe of concrete" (Alterman
2000:302; Regev 1993; De-Shalit & Talias 1994:290). But the key as
to why environmental ideologies and their attendant legal
adversarial strategies were so slow to take root in Israel is, perhaps,
encrypted in a different line within the same song: "We love you
homeland; what we haven't as yet given, we shall give" (Alterman
2000:302). In an Israel where the terms of membership have
demanded of individuals' willingness to subsume all for the greater
national good, the notion that environmental values ought to
trump state-defined national interests has long been incongruous,
if not inconceivable.
Distinctive political, military, and demographic conditions
during Israel's first decades account for the particular depth of
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SPNI's solidarity with the state. But even in the United States, the
history of the Sierra Club suggests a link between similar-if more
muted -ideological influences and consensualist patterns of
behavior. In both instances, evidence that the groups' consensu-
alism was rooted in partnership ideologies- rather than deficient
opportunity structures-comes from the tenor and logic of
arguments that adherents of consensualist strategies put forth
during vociferous moments of intraorganizational debate. These
conflicts, often pitting generational cohorts against one another,
expose processes of dispute transformation that usually remain
internal to individuals in private contexts; revealed in this way is a
progression through which organizational identity, preferences,
and commitments-rather than strategies as such-come to be
redefined. Such processes predictably leave behind "old-timers"
such as Alberta Reed Huber (in the Sierra Club) and Azariah Alon
(in SPNI).
In both the United States and Israel, the expectation that the
best-established groups would have initiated a strategy of litigation
is not borne out. Instead, upstart environmental law groups such as
the EDF and the NRDC led the U.S. environmental movement to
court, while the older groups followed suit only after some delay
and, at times, reluctantly. A similar pattern is evident in Israel
where, instead of SPNI (the country's oldest and largest conserva-
tion group), a younger group (modeled after the NRDC) was the
first Israeli environmental organization to use legal advocacy as its
primary organizational strategy (Morag-Levine 2001).
Like the Audubon Society, both the Sierra Club and SPNI did
add litigation to their organizational repertoire, and the Sierra
Club ultimately became a major litigator. Yet in both instances, the
floodgate model fits observed organizational behavior poorly.
Rather than revealing an eagerness to embrace novel political
and legal opportunities for adversarial activism-as institutional
capacity theories of interest group litigation would predict-these
organizations engaged in protracted and sometimes wrenching
debates over the shift to adversarialism. Evident in these debates
are deep divisions on matters of organizational identity, the
importance of personal and political loyalty, and the legitimacy of
challenging the developmental agenda of the state. The depth and
tenor of these disagreements suggest that impediments to the
adoption of litigation strategies for both groups lay deeper than
mere organizational "habits" or inertia. The older generation's
discomfort with the groups' subsequent turn toward all manner
of adversarial action suggests that what was at stake was the very
rationale behind their affiliation with the group. Their palpable
sense of loss in the face of a dissipating partnership with the state
detracts from the persuasiveness of institutional inertia as
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explanation for the delay in the adoption of litigation strategies by
the two groups.
The Sierra Club of 1970 and SPNI of the late 1990s assumed
an institutional identity that was sharply at odds with their former
selves. A new generation of leaders and members reshaped the
previous organizational mold to fit their own environmental
mission and pluralist notions. They inherited from their prede-
cessors an organizational shell, history, and name, but placed these
in the service of transformed organizational ends. In doing so, they
were prompted by the rise of new environmental ideologies and
new conceptions of the properly adversarial function of interest
groups-the ideas that, around the same time, contributed to
judges' liberalization of such groups' standing to sue. In retrospect,
this doctrinal change and other increases in groups' capacity to sue
offer a plausible explanation for their earlier absence from the
courts. But in taking for granted the groups' earlier adversarial
inclinations, this explanation assumes what is in fact the core
question at stake-one capable of resolution only through
historical investigation of the actual tenor of the groups' relations
with the pertinent state bureaucracies, over time.
This study has suggested a corollary between individual-level
dispute transformation and that which occurs in the realm of
interest groups. In both the individual and the group cases, an
understanding of litigation behavior must not focus on the moment
of litigation alone, but requires longitudinal study of the processes
leading to that event, most importantly of the structure of the
pertinent relations. When understood as the outcome of such
processes of institutional transformation, contemporary, and
perhaps global, growth in levels of interest group litigation emerge
as a more significant development than the floodgate model seems
to suggest. Rather than mere tactical adaptation to the opening of
hitherto blocked legal opportunities, the judicialization of politics
attests to deeper processes of separation between civil society and
the state.
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